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The owner-occupiers’ capital structure 
 during a house price boom 
- Does negative equity exist as a permanent feature  
in the Danish housing market?12
 
 
 
Abstract: 
House and flat prices have been through a tremendous bust and boom cycle in Denmark. From 
1986 to 1993 real prices for houses and flats dropped by one third on average, foreclosures 
accounted for around 1/6 of the house and flat turnovers in numbers, and in reality the market 
for owner-occupied houses and flats was in a crisis. Initiated by a strong interest rate drop and 
by an expansive finance policy, the market turned. From 1993H1 to 2004H1 real house prices 
increased 76% and real flat prices 128%. Moreover, Denmark has a leading position in the 
international household debt race and as in many other countries the fear of the consequences 
of a strong interest rate increase for the housing market is widespread. Therefore, in order to 
examine the financial stability among owner-occupiers, a sample of approx. 40,000 owner-
occupier families with data at household level has been drawn from the tax statistics for each 
year from 1987 to 2003. 
Through the analysis it is shown that the distributions of the owner-occupiers’ capital structure, 
measured by the net liability/housing wealth ratios, have more or less been the same throughout 
the 16 years, even during the long-lasting steep house and flat price rise. Moreover, since 1994 
the median value of the net liability/income ratio has increased by 71% for all owner-occupiers 
and by 54% for owner-occupiers between 30-39 years of age. 
                                                 
1 The data in the paper have been made available for this study by  “Lovmodelsekretariatet” of the Danish Ministry of 
Finance, formerly in the Ministry of Economics. I am very grateful for these data as well as for the important personal 
support, willingness and enthusiasm I have met with from Martin Ulrik Jensen, who has provided me with the basic 
statistics. I have also received invaluable support from the head of the secretariat, Peter Bach Mortensen, who 
contributed with the basic statistics to earlier versions of the paper together with Sune Enevoldsen Pedersen. The views 
expressed here are those of the author. 
2 A preliminary version of the paper was presented at the ENHR conference in Cambridge in July 2004. I thank John 
Doling as well as the participants at the “Home Ownership and Risk” session for valuable comments. 
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Finally, one last, important aspect of the financial stability of owner-occupiers, namely, their 
capacity to service their debt has been analysed. The owner-occupiers’ net interest 
expenditures/ income ratios before tax have been nearly halved from 1987 to 2003. Most of the 
drop happened  during the years of the “housing market failure”. From 1994 on the ratios were 
more slightly reduced and were in 2003 at 8.8% (median value) for all owner-occupiers and 
12.2% for owner-occupiers between 30-39 years of age. However, if the reductions of the tax 
rates for deducting interest expenditures are taken into account, the 2003  after-tax-ratios are 
only about 2 percentage points below the 1987 after-tax ratios. At March 2005, a new challenge 
facing Danish owner-occupiers is that 50% of their mortgages carry interest adjustment. 
 
Keywords: house prices, housing wealth, real estate wealth, housing debt, mortgage debt, personal 
wealth, personal finance, loan-to-value, debt-to-income, interest expenditures, interest-to-income, 
financial stability. 
JEL classifications: D 14, E 44, G 21, R 20, R 31. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
My personal motivation for writing this paper is in line with the views of Paul Krugman in his preface 
to “The Great Unravelling”: “…, I was always a stock market sceptic – though not, as you will see, 
sceptical enough. My focus on troubled economies abroad prepared me for the possibility that the 
United States would suffer serious economic difficulties once the bubble burst – though here again I 
initially understated the risks. What nobody realized was how thoroughly corrupted the U.S. corporate 
system had becomes; like everyone else, I played catch-up here.” (Krugman, 2003, p. xxviii). 
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1. Introduction: Denmark’s leading position in the household debt race. 
Household debt has increased considerably over the past decade in Denmark. Many countries have 
participated in this household debt race and Denmark is at the highest level among the analysed 
OECD countries, (Debelle, 2004). In the Danish central bank’s report on financial stability for 
2004, focus was placed on the increase in the debt-income ratio from below 150% in 1995 to 
slightly above 200% in 2003, a steeper rise on a higher level than in the other Nordic countries, 
(Danmarks Nationalbank, 2004). The denominator in this ratio is income after tax. 
 
The debt increase seems to be a common European and even a worldwide trend. A recent article in 
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin is motivated by the fact that the current amount of household 
debt outstanding is “equivalent to around 140% of aggregate household income (compared with 
around 105% ten years ago).” (Orla May et. al., 2004, p. 414).  
 
Inside Europe at the end of 2003, the residential mortgage debt to GDP ratio was 87.5% in 
Denmark, only exceeded by the Dutch ratio of 99.9%. At the end of 1994 the ratios were much 
lower: 65.0 in Denmark as the largest, and 54.8% in Sweden as the second largest (EMF, 2004). In 
the U.S. the ratio was 71% in 2003 (Earley, 2004). However, in accordance with central bank 
statistics, the ratio for all mortgage claims to GDP for 2003 was 112.9 for Switzerland3 (Swiss 
National Bank, 2004) and 99.7% for Denmark, where the owner-occupiers’ outstanding mortgages 
counted for 77.0% of all residential mortgage debt (Danmarks Nationalbank, 2005). 
 
A dilemma exists between having the macro economic advantages of an efficient financial system 
and high credit and market risk at the macro level, as noted by Earley: “Denmark has the highest 
level of mortgage debt per capita. This is likely to be explained by the fact that it has a well 
developed and efficient housing finance market, a small population and one of the highest levels of 
GDP per capita in the EU15.” Per capita the mortgage debt was even higher in Denmark than in 
the U.S. (Earley, 2004, p. 6-7). 
 
However, using the assets of the household sector instead as a scaling factor, the leverage of the 
sector had not increased “nearly as dramatically”, as the increase is “no more than 5 percentage 
points”, (Debelle, 2004). The comparison does not include Denmark. 
 
Mortgage and other housing debt account for the bulk of the household debt in Denmark. As can be 
seen in this paper, the median value for Danish owner-occupiers’ debt-asset ratio, calculated as net 
liabilities in per cent of housing wealth, increased from 41% in 1987 to 52% in 1993, again to 56% 
in 1997, and then was levelled out at 51% since 2000 (see Table 6). A slightly stronger increase has 
been observed in the owner-occupiers’ mortgage debt in the specialised mortgage banks, which 
came into favour through the deregulation of owner-occupiers’ access to mortgage loans. This has 
increased the mortgage banks’ share of the owner-occupiers’ debt. The median value of the owner-
occupiers’ mortgage LTV (mortgage debt as a per cent of housing wealth) increased from 38% in 
1987 to 53% in 1993, and increased further after the deregulation to 58% in 1995, dropping after 
1998 to 51% in 2001 – and again a rise to 55% in 2003 (see Table 16). 
 
Even though the interest rates have dropped since 1993 to an extremely low level in recent years, 
the households’ interest burden (interest-income ratio) has increased from 4% in 1995, to over 6% 
                                                 
3 Calculated as the mortgage claims for borrowers domiciled in Switzerland divided by GDP. 
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in 2001 and down to 5.5% in 2003, a level, which “is not proportionally higher than in the other 
Nordic countries,” (Danmarks Nationalbank, 2004).  
 
Economists in many countries have become aware of the risk that a sharp interest rate increase and 
a tightening of the monetary policy may not be combined with a large addition to the economic 
growth rate in their nation. For example, the headline “Are Home Prices The Next ‘Bubble’?” 
(McCarthy and Peach, 2004) reveals this fear. The fear seems widespread that the central banks’ 
strong interest rate reductions and the resulting house price rises from 2001 on would be redressed 
by a sharp interest increase without accompanying economic growth and with falling house prices 
as a result. In such an economic recession, the risk of a housing market failure with many 
foreclosures and increased financial fragility caused by losses in terms of household debt, exists. 
 
McCarthy and Peach’s headline seems to be primarily an eye-catcher as their main conclusion is: 
“A close analysis of the U.S. housing market in recent years, however, finds little basis for such 
concerns. The marked upturn in home prices is largely attributable to strong market fundamentals: 
Home prices have essentially moved in line with increases in family income and declines in nominal 
mortgage interest rates.” – Even though it is obvious that the development in house and flat prices 
could be reversed after a strong interest rate increase, they find that real home prices have fallen 
only moderately in periods of recession and high nominal interest rates. (McCarthy and Peach, 
2004). Similar results and opinions seem to be widespread among conjuncture analysts and market 
participants in different countries. 
 
During the low interest rate regime in recent years, the strong household debt rise in many countries 
has been monitored to avoid risk of financial distress. Even though many researchers and official 
spokesmen have made remarks on that issue, only two important examples will be mentioned here. 
Susan Bies argues that the stability of the households’ and owner-occupiers’ debt service ratios and 
the favourable developments on the asset side match the growth in household debt in recent years, 
and “the sector as a whole appears to be in good shape” (Bies, 2004). Alan Greenspan “scarcely 
wishes to downplay the threats to the U.S. economy from increased debt leverage” but through a 
more in-depth analysis he focuses on the same arguments as Susan Bies, and adds that household 
debt has increased faster than income for at least half a century and that homeowners’ must move 
and live elsewhere as well as large transaction costs are important restraints on the development of 
price bubbles (Greenspan, 2004). 
 
Owner-occupiers as well as other Danish debtors must recognize that concerns for their debt and 
solvency are not included in the target for the Danish central bank’s interest policy. On the very first 
page of a book on Danish monetary policy Danmarks Nationalbank describes the bank’s single 
policy target: “Denmark maintains a fixed-exchange-rate policy vis-à-vis the euro. This means that 
the objective of monetary and foreign-exchange policy is to keep the krone stable against the euro. 
Other aspects than the exchange rate – e.g. cyclical developments in Denmark – are not considered 
in relation to monetary policy.” (Danmarks Nationalbank, 2003).  
 
Probably the aggregate debt figures in the household sector cover a substantial variation across the 
individual households’ debt. In a normal life cycle young families with their own home have a 
much greater debt than pensioned owner-occupiers. At a given aggregate debt level the natural 
assumption must be to expect that the degree of inequality in the capital structure between the 
families contributes to strengthening the macro economic consequences of an increase in the 
interest rates. 
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In order to estimate the macro economic, housing market and financial institutional consequences of 
larger interest changes, knowledge of the distribution of households according to indebtedness is 
important. “Unfortunately, there is little data available on the change over time in the distribution 
of debt across households.” (Debelle, 2004, p. 54).  
 
The central banks’ studies on financial stability seem to have fostered great interest in households 
and especially owner-occupiers’ debt status. In September 2004 the Bank of England commissioned 
a survey on household debt, interviewing 1,838 individuals (renters as well as owners) throughout 
Great Britain. The interviews contained 24 questions on debt and the value of housing assets. (May 
et al., 2004). It should be noted, however, that “taken together, the unsecured and secured debt 
reported in the survey amounts to 72% of what one would expect on the basis of aggregate data” 
(May et al, 2004, p. 416). 
 
In this paper data on the distribution of the Danish owner-occupier families’ housing wealth, debt 
and interest expenditures during the years 1987-2003 have been drawn from tax statistics and 
combined in ratios for the analysis. The high tax level in Denmark has probably contributed to 
making the tax statistics valid and reliable seen in an international context. For each year the sample 
contains approximately 40,000 families. Below, figures for distribution of debt (net liabilities), 
debt-asset ratios, debt-income ratios, interest expenditures and interest-income ratios for the 
individual Danish owner-occupier families are presented. 
  
Especially wealth data seem reliable as the owner-occupiers’ housing wealth (measured by the 
publicly assessed property values) is in principle assessed at a market price level by the tax 
authorities. As only a fraction of the properties are put on the market and sold to market prices 
during the year, the calculations must rely on assessed values. The public assessments are very 
precise on average, but individual properties may vary considerably from the average. This variance 
means that the study’s net liability/housing wealth ratios are indicators of the true capital structure 
for owner-occupiers. This reservation does not apply to the debt/income and interest/income ratios. 
The most important financial assets and liabilities are calculated at market values and are reported 
by the financial institutions together with interest incomes and expenditures. 
 
To examine the risk of financial stress among the Danish owner-occupiers and the financial stability 
in the household sector, debt/asset ratios express the security behind their debt, debt/income ratios 
express their ability to repay the debt, and interest/income ratios express their actual debt service 
burden. The paper can be interpreted as an indicator of the house and flat markets’ robustness in 
the face of potentially falling prices of owner-occupied dwellings and/or increasing interest rates. 
The paper is therefore a contribution to the estimation of the owner-occupiers’ price and interest 
rate risk and the mortgage and commercial banks’ credit quality.  However, the paper does not have 
any prognostic content. Data and ratios are presented for all owner-occupier families as well as for 
the younger group between 30 and 39 years of age, to indicate the capital structure and financial 
stress situation among owners who bought their first or second owner-occupied dwelling a few 
years earlier. 
 
 
2. Danish market for owner-occupied houses and flats– an overview. 
The Danish economy experienced a recession at the end of the 1980s. Among other negative 
factors, the tax value of the deductions of interest expenditures in the taxed income was reduced in 
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1987, an interest rate drop increased the market value of the mortgage debt, and the prices for 
houses and flats began to fall. The result was a “housing market failure” in the period 1987-1993. 
Negative equity and foreclosures were regular occurrences during these years. 
 
The economy turned around in 1993-1994. A sharp interest rate drop was seen as result of the 
Edinburgh agreement and the elimination of speculations on a devaluation of the Danish currency. 
The prices for the callable mortgage bonds were close to price 100 and for many bond types above 
100, and the falling interest rates could therefore not increase the market values of mortgage debt as 
much as on earlier occasions. A new government eased the finance policy to stimulate the economy 
and not least the housing market. The Danish economy  returned to prosperity and has since then 
been seen as fundamentally “healthy” by most economists and politicians.  
 
House prices began to increase sharply during subsequent years and indeed continue to do so. The 
number of foreclosures dropped to a stable, very low figure. During the first half year of 2004 house 
prices were 122% higher than during the  first half year of 1993 (Told og Skat, 2004b). General 
inflation, measured by the consumer price index, was 26% in the same period. As result, the real 
house price rise for the 11 years was 76%. For owner-occupied flats the real price rise was 128% 
for the 11 years.  
 
Earlier real house price rises had been seen during the 1960s and 1970s, interrupted by a drop under 
the first oil crisis. From 1980 on house price statistics were conceptually improved to express the 
development in the market prices. The development in real house prices is seen in Figure 1. The tax 
authority’s price index for sold houses has been used and the index is based on the increase in the 
ratio of sale prices/publicly assessed property values. Again, the consumer price index was chosen 
to deflate the prices. 
 
Figure 1. 
Development in real prices for owner-occupied, one-family houses, 1980 – 2003. 
 
Source: Told og Skat, Ejendomssalg (Customs and Tax, Property sales). (Here after (Erik Haller Pedersen, 2004)).
 
From 1980 on real house prices followed two waves with a drop of around 1/3 from top to bottom 
and then a return to the former level as shown in Figure 1. The first wave began in 1979, after th
second oil crisis and did not result in large drops in nominal prices. After again having reached a 
 
e 
maximum in 1986, real house prices dropped by 33% and nominal house prices by 20% in the 
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second wave, which lasted until 1993. Both crises were accompanied by high numbers of 
foreclosures, annually corresponding to around 1/6 of the turnovers of properties.  
 
High volatility as well as boom and busts are obviously found in the Danish real house prices, but 
ey are not an exceptional view in an international context. Similar or even stronger house price 
luded that 
 in 
level with data on the owner-occupiers’ wealth 
xists for earlier years. 1987 represented the start of the “housing market failure”, partly combined 
 in 
The 
that after the economy turned around in 1993, the capital structure among 
e owner-occupiers would improve, was disconfirmed. The figures for the years 1987-1996 
howed that negative equity was as common as before (Lunde, 1999a and 1999b). Loan-to-values 
d the market values of fixed interest rate mortgage debt, to the 
es in the 
ggregate equity in owner-occupied dwellings. However, this reveals nothing about the outstanding 
. The mortgage system, falling interest rates and “natural” causes of mortgage debt increases 
 
 though Denmark 
hose not to join the euro in a referendum in 2000, the interest rate spread is still low. 
 
                                                
th
cycles are found for many OECD countries (Kennedy & Andersen, 1994; Sutton, 2002; ECB, 
2003), and autocorrelation in the prices was also found for all these countries (Englund and 
Ioannides, 1997). 
 
The first study of the Danish owner-occupiers capital structure for the years 1987-88 conc
the share of owner-occupiers in (technical) insolvency had increased from 16% in 1987 to 23%
1988 (Lunde, 1990). No statistics on household 
e
with a financial crisis (the Nordic Banking Crisis)4. The falling interest rates lead to an increase
the market value of the debt, but house prices nevertheless reacted negatively and began to fall. 
result of the next study, which indicated that the capital structure among owner-occupiers had not 
improved during the crisis years up to 1993, came as no surprise (see Lunde, 1999 b).  
 
The common expectation 
th
s
(LTVs) for mortgage loans  worsened slightly in the years following 1993, primarily due to the 
interest rate drops increase
deregulation and to the possibility for equity withdrawal by raising a mortgage loan using the 
proceeds to prepay bank loans and other loans. 
 
Today the popular view is still that the owner-occupiers’ solvency has improved considerably. 
Some mortgage banks have published calculations in the media showing major increas
a
debt and especially about the more indebted owner-occupiers. Data presented in the central bank’s 
articles and reports on ”Financial Stability” do not indicate that the capital structure of owner-
occupiers has improved.  
 
 
3
and equity withdrawal. 
Since the government announced in 1982 that Denmark no longer wanted to use devaluation of the 
exchange rate to depress internal inflation and to improve the balance of payments, the development
in Danish interest rates have shadowed first the DM and subsequently the euro interest rates. For a 
number of years in the 1980s the spread of these interest rates became small. Even
c
 
Since 1993 Danish interest rates have been “low” and have fallen nearly continuously, so that rates 
are now at an historical low level. The rate-of-return was 4.49% for the 4% 30-year mortgage bonds
and 2.28% for 2 % 1-year mortgage bonds (used for adjustable-rate loans) (7 March 2005). In order 
 
4 However, the solvency among owner-occupiers was not at a favourable position in 1987 as the real prices for single 
family houses had dropped by 11% from the maximum in the first half year of 1986 to the second half year of 1987 and 
as the number of foreclosures had started to increase. During 1987 the interest rate level was relatively stable. 
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to calculate the debtor interest rates, approximately 0.5% in fees to the mortgage banks must be 
added to these figures. 
 
Traditionally, Danish mortgages have had 20- and 30-year terms and have been fixed interes
loans, mainly formed as annuity loans. In 1996 adjustable-rate mortgage loans were introduc
by 1999 they accounted for 5.7% of the outstanding mortgage loans. Since then, their market share 
has grown quickly and by the end of March 2005, they accounted for 50% of the owner-occupiers’ 
mortgage loans and for 48% all mortgage loans (Danmarks Nationalbank, 2005). 
 
t bond 
ed and 
anish legislation on the specialised mortgage loans contains loan-to-value rules for the different 
i.e. 
 
lue in 
r 
piers’ debt is equal to the market value of the bonds behind it. An interest rate drop 
creases the prices of the bonds and thereby the value of the debt (and vice versa in the case of an 
 
tivated by a change of loan type to adjustable-rate mortgages.
LTV 
h bank 
n 
omic advantage of a 
ortgage system. Undoubtedly, this is a broad channel for increasing the debt in the owner-
nce, renovation and improvements of the house are  also often financed 
rough loans. Such activities do not only add to the debt but also to the value of the property. In 
                                                
D
categories of properties. For many years the maximum LTV for owner-occupiers has been 80%, 
the proceeds of the mortgage loan can be up to 80% of the property’s market value as estimated by
the mortgage lender. After loan raising, a price drop or an “automatic” increase in the debt va
the face of an interest rate reduction could bring the LTV up above the 80% without the debto
having to make extraordinary prepayments.  
 
The falling interest rate contributes by itself to the increase in the owner-occupiers’ debt as 
registered in tax statistics, in which the debt is measured in market values. As fixed interest 
mortgages can always be prepaid when buying the bonds on the capital market, the market value of 
the owner-occu
in
interest rate rise).  
 
Fixed interest mortgages contain a prepayment option at price 100. The interest rate drops since 
1993 have been accompanied by very high prepayment activity. In the years 1994 and 1998 early 
redemptions were close to 30% of the outstanding mortgage loans. The early redemptions of 
mortgages were also high in 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004 but an important part of these
redemptions were mo 5
 
Prepayment after an interest rate drop is realized as lower debt service, but at the same time is 
realized as an increase of the debt. Moreover, normally prepayment costs as well as loan raising 
costs are included in the new loan’s proceed. This debt increase is allowed even if the debtor’s 
exceeds 80%. 
 
At the time of purchase, the sale price of an owner-occupied dwelling is normally financed at the 
maximum LTV of 80% as a mortgage loan and a large part of the remaining buying value wit
loans or – especially earlier – purchase-money mortgages. In most cases down payments are rather 
low, especially for first-time buyers. The turnover of owner-occupied dwellings therefore implies a
”automatic” withdrawal of equity and this represents an important macro econ
m
occupied dwellings. 
 
Owner-occupiers’ maintena
th
 
5 Also, the introduction to owner-occupiers on 1 October  2003 of interest-only mortgage loans with a maximum period 
of 10 years of interest-only debt service, resulted in some prepayment activity. Interest-only mortgages had a market 
share of 20.6% of mortgage loans to owner-occupiers at the end of January 2005 (Danmarks Nationalbank, 2005). 
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practice the raising of mortgages, for whatever purpose, is often accompanied by a loan that is 
higher than necessary to finance the activity and thereby the equity withdrawal. 
 
Certainly, some increase in owner-occupiers’ debt after the strong price rises, i.e. some realisation 
of capital gains will have the character of equity withdrawal. No current estimates for equity 
withdrawal exist in Denmark as, for example, in the UK. The realisation of capital gains or drops in 
wner-occupied dwellings potentially has a minor effect on  private consumption in the short run, 
ut not in the long or even medium perspective, (Miles, 1994; Lunde, 1998).  
es of the 
ust be whether there are relatively more owner-
ccupiers who are highly indebted and therefore a greater risk for many foreclosures if property 
. It is 
n 6. 
ely on 
fairs 
he study’s data come from a random sample of about 1/30 or approximately 40,000 owner-
 
 
for example, 
oth a house and a summer cottage. Also some families have bought another dwelling without 
ousing wealth figures must necessarily rely on assessed values and most obviously on the publicly 
assessed property values as of  1 January as estimated by a central tax authority in cooperation with 
                                                
o
b
 
The risks of financing the stock of owner-occupied dwellings at higher levels of debt are divided 
between the owner-occupiers themselves, the lenders (mortgage and commercial banks), and 
society (the state budget).  
 
Unless the aggregate debt in owner-occupied dwellings has risen more or less than all valu
owner-occupied dwellings, the crucial question m
o
prices drop. This will increase the risk of losses and in the worst case activate a systemic risk
therefore important to analyse the development in the owner-occupiers’ debt and equity at the 
individual family level. This is possible through the data presented starting in Sectio
 
 
4. Method: The study, the statistic sources and the data.  
The data in the tax statistics on Danish owner-occupier families’ wealth and capital structure r
the tax authorities’ assessments of these families. The data have been made available for this study 
by  “Lovmodelsekretariatet”, formerly under the Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Af
and now under the Ministry of Finance. The tax authorities have a relatively precise knowledge of 
the families’ incomes and interests (capital income) besides on the assets and liabilities in 
connection with the owner-occupied dwellings.  
 
T
occupier families within the specific year. The results are multiplied by a factor of about 30, which 
varies a little from year to year. The numbers ensure the reliability of the results.6  
 
The owner-occupier family’s housing wealth includes the total value of properties owned solely for
the purpose of meeting the family’s own housing needs. A family’s housing wealth can be placed in
single family houses, owner-occupied flats, the owner’s own flat in a residential multi-storey 
building, farmhouses and summer cottages and may comprise more than one dwelling, 
b
having sold the old one during the year. The definition of an owner-occupied dwelling relies on the 
owner’s taxation of imputed rent, and, after 2000, on paying property value tax. A dwelling the 
family owns and rents out (possibly to children), is not taxed with property value tax and is 
therefore not counted as owner-occupied. 
 
H
 
6 An earlier study for 1987-88 was based on the total number (Lunde, 1990). A comparison (Lunde, 1999b) between the 
results in the sample and in the aggregate statistics for the two years only exposed quite small differences in the first 
decimal place. 
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the local authority. The publicly assessed property values are used as proxies for the market valu
of the properties, even though the market values are systematically underestimated, on average by
around 10% (see Section 9 below), which is approximately equal to the transaction costs of
the house or flat. Also, there is significant variance between assessed price
es 
 
 selling 
s and market prices for 
e single houses and flats. From 2003 the assessment date was changed to 1 October. 
 and 
, 
d loans 
ts and 
 
 
 1987-1996, i.e. the first part of the study period, Danes were liable to wealth tax. Besides 
rsonal wealth is no longer self-assessed and a pure 
ealth statistic is no longer produced. Still the tax authorities assess property values in order to 
wever, 
cial 
imate of the 
se 
he 
ey are paid 
ut to citizens and are therefore only around half as valuable for the pensioners. Second, these 
have been saving for many years, but these families have in general a lower debt. 
th
 
The assessed property values are directly transmitted to the owners’ tax assessment. Mortgage
commercial banks report interests and capital values at all securities (bonds, equities and others)
deposits and loans directly to the tax authorities. The capital values for securities, deposits an
in financial institutions are calculated for the year according to prices on 31 December. Asse
liabilities are thus calculated at market values. These data are precise. 
 
The owner-occupiers’ total net wealth has always been calculated on 31 December for the year.
Unfortunately, before 2003 the publicly assessed property values are calculated on 1 January the
same year. If the property prices have risen or dropped through the year, the wealth on  31 
December underestimates or overestimates the properties’ market values. 
 
In
property value, financial assets and liabilities, the wealth included money (cash), cars, boats, 
furniture, diamonds, etc., the value of which tax payers were required to assess for the local tax 
authority. In most cases the value of these assets was relatively low compared to the owner-
occupied properties and financial assets and liabilities. Therefore, the rather imprecise self-
assessments of these physical assets had no important consequences for the wealth statistics. 
  
The wealth tax was abolished after 1996, pe
w
charge land tax and property value tax (before 2000, the tax on imputed rents on the owner-
occupied dwellings). Banks still report interest, deposits and loans to the tax authorities. Ho
since 1997 the values of cash, cars, furniture and similar family assets are no longer assessed.  
 
The wealth statistics used since 1997 are based on the reported assets and liabilities and comprise 
the owner-occupiers’ most important assets: publicly assessed property values, deposits in finan
institutions, securities (bonds, equities), and liabilities: debt in mortgage and commercial banks. 
Only few, less important types of financial assets, with the cash balance and cars as the most 
important, are not included. The wealth measure used gives a relatively precise est
owners’ wealth and capital structure. The following analyses confirm this view as the different 
methods can only be tracked in few cases. 
 
Institutional savings for pension schemes have never been included in the wealth taxation, and the
savings are therefore not registered in the personal tax assessments and in the data here. In 
aggregate, the institutional savings for pension purposes have approximately the same value as t
owner-occupied dwellings (see next section). However, four causes explain why the ignoring of 
pension saving is of no great significance. First, such pension savings are taxed when th
o
savings are illiquid as they cannot be withdrawn without heavy taxation. Third, tenants also have 
pension savings. Fourth, the largest pension savings are found among persons and families who 
 10
Until 1996, the equity in privately owned firms such as farming, retail businesses, workshops and 
services, were included in the families’ wealth. Starting in 1997, all privately owned commercial 
ssets and liabilities were included in the self-employed families’ wealth, i.e. the statistic was 
s are 
 
per 
he incomes in the study are derived from the tax statistics and are calculated with same precision 
s the taxable incomes. The incomes are defined in accordance with the Danish tax rules and as the 
 
ver 
r-occupiers in the aggregate have 
creased more than property values. This method has been used by mortgage banks on several 
 
iers’ debt is understood as mortgages from the specialised mortgage 
anks. Otherwise, the owners’ debt is often seen as all types of loans with registered security in the 
alth 
s 
easured at market value, the 
evelopment in mortgage debt can be analysed separately. When the financial system was 
a
changed from a net to a gross concept. The aggregate and average asset and liability amount
highly influenced by this change, while the influence on the different ratios is difficult to find.7 In
Section 5 the owner-occupiers’ aggregate housing wealth, mortgage debt and net liabilities are 
presented for all owner-occupiers, as well as without the self-employed. In the last part of the pa
figures are only presented for owner-occupiers, excluding the self-employed families. 
 
T
a
sum of  “personal income” and “positive net capital income”. Until 2000 the imputed rent of own 
dwelling is included in the positive net capital incomes.  
 
The family is the statistical unit in the study. From 1991 on the so-called D-family concept 
containing singles, married couples and couples living together, has been used. The definition of
couples living together without common children is: being only 2 persons at the same address, o
16 years of age, of different sexes, and at an age difference below 15 years. For the years 1987-
1990 another similar family concept has been used, where 2 adults of different sexes must have 
common children to be a family unit. 
 
 
5. Aggregate owner-occupied housing wealth, mortgage debt and net liabilities –a macro view. 
As mentioned above, the analysis of owner-occupiers’ equity and debt in many countries has been 
restricted to a study of whether the debt on loans issued to owne
in
occasions and was the basis for the Association of Mortgage Banks’ conclusion in their annual
report in 2002: ””Loan-to-value” (LTV) calculations for Danish mortgage banks are low. For 
owner-occupied dwellings around 90% of the loan portfolio is placed below 60% of the value of the 
properties…” (Realkreditrådet, 2003, p. 34). Therefore, the aggregate capital structure for owner-
occupiers, expressed as the aggregate and thereby average LTV, is analysed below first. 
 
Sometimes, owner-occup
b
property, which besides mortgages from specialised banks includes loans in commercial banks and 
purchase-money mortgages. Other loan sources are negligible.  
 
However, the tax statistics give the opportunity to include all the owner-occupiers’ assets and 
liabilities, combined in the expression net liabilities and compare these with their housing we
(property values). The value of all financial assets and liabilities are calculated at market values. A
the tax statistics also specify the owner-occupiers’ mortgage debt, m
d
deregulated in around 1992-93, the opportunities for owner-occupiers to raise mortgages were 
improved considerably. 
 
                                                 
7 The implicit result is that the capital structures in small privately owned firms are about the same as among owner-
occupiers. 
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Moreover, the owner-occupiers’ net liabilities provide the best analytical basis, as the addition of all
the owner-occupier family’s assets and liabilities is the best expression of their capital 
 
structure and 
quity. The equity is an important contribution to the owners’ possibility to raise more liquidity if 
ugh to 
over the registered debt, the debtor still owes the remaining debt.  
eported assets and 
abilities, which include privately owned commercial assets and liabilities. The consequences of 
igures, 
988-
nfortunately,  the mortgage debt values for 1994 do not exist in the tax statistics and could not be 
in the analysis below. Otherwise, the removal of mortgage restrictions in 1992-93 might 
 assets and liabilities are included.  
 
When the o ’ cap re is  the sing
the ratios a art el than their mortga eir e
correspondi lso t et liab  varies on tly throu
19 96, eve gh the chan the owner- ers’ net liab
w do not c e very well. the ratio is nearly doubled. This remark
change is metho ically based  content o ata and recu the difference b en the 
results when using the two differe hods for es ng the owne upiers’ ratios f 95 
an 6. For 1 003 the net  appreciable st y. 
 
Table 1. 
A ate hous alth (public ssed p ), mortgage debt and net liabilities for 
al er-occup including th mploy r 1996 – ding assets ies 
in privately owned firms. 1987 – 2003.     
Ow ed 
ho th 
(publicly assessed 
pr e) 
O
occupiers’ 
a  
mor ebt 
B  
Owner-occupiers 
agg et 
li  
B  
Averag tgage 
loan-t e for 
owne piers 
P t 
Ave et 
liability/housing 
wealt  for 
owne piers 
P t 
e
necessary. Moreover, in accordance with Danish law a debtor is liable to the full extent of his 
assets. Therefore, owner-occupiers are not only liable to the value of their house or flats for 
mortgages and other secured loans, but if the proceeds from a foreclosure are not high eno
c
 
All owner-occupiers’ housing wealth (publicly assessed property values), mortgage debt and net 
liabilities for the years 1987-2003 are seen in Table 1, where the average mortgage loan-to-value 
and average net liability/housing wealth ratios are shown, too. Until 1996 the wealth statistic has 
been used. From 1997 on wealth is calculated from the financial institutions’ r
li
this methodological shift are illustrated for the years 1995 and 1996, where the results from the 
wealth statistics (the “low” figures in Table 1 and 2 below) are compared with the reported f
which include privately owned commercial properties, financial assets and liabilities. 
 
The estimated average mortgage loan-to-values do only express a weak variation in the years 1
1993 but are somewhat above the 1987 ratio. The owner-occupiers’ aggregate mortgage debt varies 
only moderately, while the property values have been more volatile through these years.  
 
U
included 
have had a direct influence on mortgage debt figures from 1994 already, as a considerably increase 
in the mortgage LTV up to below 70% appeared in 1995-1996. In the subsequent years the ratios 
are influenced by the fact that commercial
wner-occupiers
re for the most p
ng . A
ital structu
 at a lower lev
he  n
measured by  net liability/hou
ge LTV, and th
 wealth ratios, 
quity is 
gh s ly higher  average ility ratio ly sligh the year
87-19 n thou ges in occupi ilities and in the housing 
ealth orrelat  From 1997 on, able 
dolog  on the f the d rs in etwe
nt met timati r-occ or 19
d 199 997-2 liability/housing wealth ratio contains an abilit
ggreg ing we ly asse roperty value
l own iers ( e self-e ed) and – afte  inclu  and liabilit
 ner-occupi
using weal
operty valu
Bn. DKK 
wner-
ggregate
tgage d
n. DKK
regate n
abilities
 
n. DKK
e mor
o-valu
r-occu
 
er cen
rage n
h ratio
r-occu
er cen
1987 763.2 322.1 151.1 42.2 19.8 
1988 726.8 364.6 191.6 50.2 26.4 
1989 763.6 368.6 196.1 48.3 25.7 
1990 714.7 354.6 155.3 49.6 21.7 
1991 676.8 369.3 172.4 54.6 25.5 
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1992 746.4 367.9 150.1 49.3 21.1 
1993 745.4 393.1 154.1 52.7 20.7 
1994 736.8 --- 121.2 --- 16.4 
1995 779.7 545.3 155.2 / 314.7* 69.9 19.9 / 40.4* 
1996 907.2 593.6 142.6 / 314.9* 65.4 15.7 / 34.7* 
1997** 1163.6** 665.7 483.9 57.2 41.6 
1998** 1297.0** 731.7 537.8 56.4 41.5 
1999** 1436.0** 750.8 555.4 52.3 38.7 
2000** 1581.9** 793.8 592.6 50.2 37.5 
2001** 1731.3** 868.1 680.7 50.1 39.3 
2002** 1847.4** 945.8 750.3 51.2 40.6 
2003** 1940.3** 1023.0 768.1 52.7 39.6 
* Reported assets and liabilities, including commercial assets and liabilities, excluding property wealth.  
** Including privately owned commercial properties, financial assets and liabilities. 
 
It is rather unsatisfactory that privately owned commercial assets and liabilities are included after
1996. Therefore, in Table 2 below as well as in the tables showing th
 
e distribution of debt across 
ouseholds and the ratios,  only data for owner-occupier families not including the self-employed 
ted. 
TV is at the same level and 
exp esse an l n ase in
slightly weaker after 1993, when the self-emp  inc th
fade slowly and starting in the ye 000 the ow piers’
same level nd of the he fact t erage mo TV has more or less have 
the same values roughly indicates that the owner-occupied houses and commercial properties have 
been mortgaged to the same degree. Similarly, th l and the var  in the owner-o iers’ 
n bility/h g wealth rati  fairly unifo th with and ut the self-emp
t thodo  shift in 199 onwards, th iability/hous ealth ratios are tly 
lower, when the self-employed are not included as seen in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. 
A gate ho  wealth (pub ssessed e), mortgage debt and net liabilities for 
a ner-oc s (excluding lf-emplo  2003.     
Own pied 
hou lth 
(publicly assessed 
pro ue) 
B  
Owner-occupiers’ 
aggreg  
B  
Owner-occupiers 
agg et 
li  
B  
Averag tgage 
loan-t e for 
owne piers 
P t 
Av et 
liability/h g wealth 
ratios ner-
occupiers 
P t 
h
are presen
 
As seen in Table 2 for the years 1987-1993, the average mortgage L
r s a similar vari ce as when the se
 2
f-employed are i
loyed not are
ner ccu
cluded. The incre
luded, but in bo
 avera
 the ratio is 
 cases the increases 
V is back at the ar -o ge mortgage LT
as at the e  1980s. T hat the av rtgage L
e leve iation ccup
et lia ousin os are rm bo witho loyed. After 
he me logical 7 and e net l ing w  sligh
ggre using licly a  property valu
ll ow cupier  the se yed). 1987 –
 er-occu
sing wea
perty val
n. DKK
ate mortgage
debt 
 
n. DKK
regate n
abilities
 
n. DKK
e mor
o-valu
r-occu
 
er cen
erage n
ousin
 for ow
er cen
1987 652.2 280.5 155.0 43.0 23.8 
1988 618.4 316.5 173.5 51.2 28.0 
1989 655.1 320.1 174.2 48.9 26.6 
1990 616.0 308.7 127.4 50.1 20.7 
1991 612.6 340.0 146.3 55.5 23.9 
1992 643.8 321.6 136.5 50.0 21.2 
1993 649.6 349.0 148.5 53.7 22.9 
1994 652.3 --- 108.2 --- 16.6 
1995 694.6 404.1 153.4 / 291.9* 58.2 22.1 / 42.0* 
1996 815.8 449.8 160.2 / 198.4* 55.1 19.6 / 24.3* 
1997 927.6 509.6 327.3 54.9 35.3 
1998 1026.4 557.7 362.7 54.3 35.3 
1999 1156.7 583.9 394.9 50.5 34.1 
2000 1286.1 623.2 413.6 48.5 32.2 
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2001 1385.9 667.7 456.1 48.1 32.9 
2002 1502.4 740.5 534.4 49.3 35.6 
2003 1597.3 808.6 550.8 50.6 34.5 
* Reported assets and liabilities, excluding housing wealth. 
 
From this comparison of the average ratios it can be concluded that the methodological shift from 
the taxable wealth statistics to registered wealth statistics seems only to influence the ratios slightly.
Moreover, the cash balance – one of the most important omitted parts – amounts to about 50 bn. 
KK in 1996 or 6% of the housing wealth
 
 for that year. 
e 
l content. 
 
The deb utsta s to owne d  dwellings are also 
shown in Table 3 e only been publ
m red as the or  proceed minus ordinary instalments, not at lated 
mortgage LTVs are somewhat lower than wa lculated from the data in Tables 1 and 2 until year 
2000, when the difference changed signs. 
 
Table 3. 
Alternative calculation of aggregate housing wealth (publicly assessed property value), mortgage 
debt and mortgage LTV for all owner-occupiers (including the self-employed), based on the official 
macro economic model ADAM and financia tics. 1987 – 2003
Owner-o  housing 
weal AM.  
At market v d of year. 
B  
Owner-occupiers’ 
aggreg  
debt ear. 
B  
Average ge loan-
to-valu wner-
occupiers 
P t 
D
 
The most commonly used method for calculating average mortgage LTV is shown in Table 3. In th
official Danish macro economic model, ADAM, the stock of owner-occupied dwellings is estimated 
at market values and the time series for the stock is shown. The differences in the estimations of the 
ow er-occ  can be  diffn upied housing wealth attributed to the
nding mortgage
erent methodologica
r-occupiet on the mortgage banks’ o
, but hav ished since 1992. The debt in this financial statistic is 
easu iginal  market values. The calcu
s ca
l statis .     
 c
th in AD
cupied
alues, en
n. DKK
ate mortgage
, end of y
n. DKK
mortga
e for o
er cen
1987 806.3 --- --- 
1988 820.7 --- --- 
1989 810.5 --- --- 
1990 744.7 --- --- 
1991 746.7 --- --- 
1992 712.2 --- --- 
1993 700.5 367.7 52.5 
1994 784.6 389.5 49.6 
1995 852.5 409.2 48.0 
1996 953.1 445.0 46.7 
1997 1063.1 495.0 46.6 
1998 1170.5 539.91) 46.1 
1999 1258.6 596.1 47.4 
2000 1348.2 628.6 46.6 
2001 1427.9 697.2 48.8 
2002 1485.1 757.1 51.0 
2003 1545.6 826.2 53.5 
1) End of September 1998. 
 
The statistical content of Table 3 is also used to assess whether the research data are valid. 
Respecting the methodological and conceptual differences, the content of Table 3 and Table 2 i
quite similar.  
 
s 
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The Danes’ total pension savings (in pension funds, life insurance companies and other institutional 
pension saving institutions) amounted to 1609.4 bn. DKK at the end of 2003, and 1507.1 bn. DKK 
t the end of 2002, which was similar to the 115.1% and 110.8% of GDP for the years 
owner-occupied 
dw o 
typ
the pen total 
ension savings are deferred income taxes. However, the owner-occupied dwellings are security for 
 
e 
 the 
acro level of the stability in the estimated ratios indicates 
a) that the capital structure among the owner-occupiers has been and is relatively stable, 
b) and that the owner-occupiers debt as well as equities have been rising steeply, as the house 
 rising since 1993.  
ent 
e 
quity for owner-occupiers should not be estimated on the basis of aggregate data but rather by 
 this section by looking at their nominal debt. Below, the owner-occupier families have been 
d according to the size of their nominal debt, i.e. without giving consideration to the size 
ebt i s r t ab .e n il u ia
et ities de de n mo ge, b nd o loans us de ts in s, bo
ies ther ncial ts (ex ing i tion nsion ings)  val  the o -
ie pert not in ded in  net l ty. T wner upiers are divided into deciles 
din he si f thei t liabilities at the end of each year e ye 987-  in T . 
alu a dec xpres  the v at th er li  the decile. Fo ample, in 1999 60% 
 ow occu  had a et liability of 524,000 DKK or bel hile  had rger d
 4.
r-o iers ed in eciles according to the size of net liabilities in 1000 DKK. All 
r-o ers ( uding  self- oyed 87 – . 
1st  2nd e 3rd 4th  5th  6th  7th  8th  9t  10  
a
(Skatteministeriet, 2004). This non-liquid institutional pensions savings and the 
ellings are the households’ most important assets. It should be noted when comparing the tw
es of savings that pensions are taxed as income when paid out to the savers, as the payments to 
sion savings have been drawn on untaxed income. Therefore, approximately half of the 
p
mortgages, and the equity is therefore much lower than the value shown. Half of the pension 
savings in 2003 is 805 bn. DKK. This amount is quite similar to the equity in owner-occupied
dwellings of 788 bn. DKK, when the mortgage debt of 809 bn. DKK has been withdrawn from th
housing wealth of 1597 bn. DKK for owner-occupiers (excluding the self-employed) in 2003. If
net liabilities of 550 bn. DKK had been withdrawn instead, the owners equity is 1047 bn. DKK.  
 
This comparison at m
and flat prices and therefore the property values have been strongly
 
However, analysing the financial stability in the owner-occupation sector through the developm
in the average LTV or other macro debt ratios is unsatisfactory in the light of the sharp price 
increases for owner-occupied properties. The aggregate capital structure and aggregate negativ
e
adding up the data for individual owner-occupiers. The distribution of debt among owner-occupier 
families needs to be analysed further in detail. Moreover, the owner-occupiers’ payments must be 
observed. 
 
 
6. The distribution and growth in the owner-occupiers’ net liabilities 
The analysis of the Danish owner-occupier families’ financial stability and payment capacity starts 
in
distribute
of their housing wealth as security or to their income as a measure of their payment capacity.  
 
D s in this tudy exp essed as he net li ilities, i . as fina cial liab ities min s financ l assets. 
The n liabil inclu bt o rtga ank a ther  min posi  bank nds, 
equit  and o  fina asse clud nstitu al pe  sav . The ue of wner
occup r’s pro y is clu  the iabili he o -occ
accor g to t ze o r ne  in th ars 1 2003 able 4
The v e of ile e ses alue e upp mit in r ex
of the ner- piers  n ow, w  40%  a la ebt. 
 
Table  
Owne ccup divid to d
owne ccupi excl  the empl ). 19 2003
 
 decile  decil  decile decile  decile decile  decile  decile h  decile th  decile
1987 -204 -50 12 98 191 276 362 469 632 >632 
1988 -219 -54 13 109 208 298 393 508 683 >683 
 15
1989 -223 -51 16 114 211 301 393 512 690 >690 
1990 -249 -61 12 108 201 288 384 497 674 >674 
1991 -284 -77 4 103 211 313 414 538 720 >720 
1992 -293 -79 5 114 227 326 426 548 722 >722 
1993 -305 -77 8 119 235 337 444 571 757 >757 
1994 -316 -88 1 110 218 317 419 536 700 >700 
1995 -335 -89 7 127 245 355 466 596 781 >781 
1996 -343 -91 13 148 274 389 507 651 850 >850 
1997 -326 -71 46 194 327 457 598 761 1005 >1005 
1998 -348 -78 57 217 359 497 647 820 1079 >1079 
1999 -358 -75 67 235 383 524 673 851 1114 >1114 
2000 -377 -75 79 256 411 560 718 908 1198 >1198 
2001 -398 -87 77 260 423 585 754 961 1265 >1265 
2002 -398 -77 100 296 473 640 816 1032 1357 >1357 
2003 -427 -84 107 313 495 671 863 1.085 1416 >1416 
 
Negative values in the table represent owner-occupiers with positive financial net savings besides 
their properties. For example, in 1988 20% of the owner-occupiers had net savings of 54,000 DKK 
hich owner-occupiers have the largest net liabilities, the net debt had more than 
Moreover, the percentage debt rise has been largest in the 3rd and 4th deciles, where owner-
 
tia ts in ebt s ure a vere r pier able
ge ble i ather rtan ermin n pr usly 
e, 1  199 nd for the net liability/h g wealth ratio in Table 7 below. It seems 
nab  use  cyc alysi the b g an ncin a hou r flat. In Table 5 this 
 for e ba r foc g on et li ies f  you  own cupi etwe -
ars ge. 
 5.
r-o iers ed in eciles according to the size of net ilities 000 . Ow
ier clud he se ploy etwe -39 s of a 989 03. 
1st  2nd e 3rd  4th  5th  6
th  7th  8  9t  10  
or more in addition to the value of their owner-occupied property. Through the period more than 
20% of the owner-occupier families have had a net savings position, but since 1994 a weak 
tendency can be observed towards fewer owners having positive net savings. However, the lowest 
decile value of the net savings doubled, while the consumer price index increased 55% in the 
period. 
 
In the deciles in w
doubled. 
occupiers (with debt) have lowest debt. Obviously the debt has risen in real terms. It should be 
noted that the growth in the net liabilities only increased to higher rates from 1994 on, and the debt
increase is thus concentrated on the last part of the period. 
  
Poten l shif the d truct re co d within the group of owne -occu s in T  4. 
The a varia s a r  impo t det ant for the debt structure as show evio (see 
Lund 990, 9b) a ousin
reaso le to a life le an s for uyin d fina g of se o
view ms th sis fo usin  the n abilit or the nger er-oc ers b en 30
39 ye  of a
 
Table  
Owne ccup divid to d  liab  in 1  DKK ner-
occup s (ex ing t lf-em ed) b en 30 year ge. 1  – 20
 
 decile  decil  decile decile  decile  decile  decile th decile h  decile th  decile
1987 102 203 278 340 403 467 544 638 776 >776 
1988 111 224 303 373 441 509 590 688 848 >848 
1989 109 225 304 372 441 514 594 695 840 >840 
1990 108 217 294 362 428 493 575 677 833 >833 
1991 125 246 329 393 464 532 611 710 876 >876 
1992 156 268 349 416 481 551 626 723 871 >871 
1993 151 270 355 425 497 575 655 756 928 >928 
1994 134 252 330 401 469 535 608 703 840 >840 
1995 156 282 373 449 525 598 684 789 942 >942 
1996 155 301 400 486 565 651 743 858 1035 >1035 
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1997 214 363 476 574 669 764 865 997 1224 >1224 
1998 226 388 514 619 724 820 937 1081 1307 >1307 
1999 259 423 542 651 756 856 970 1124 1357 >1357 
273 447 583 699 812 925 1049 122000 06 1458 >1458 
2001 261 458 600 720 840 966 1097 1264 1519 >1519 
2002 298 505 654 782 899 1026 1173 1358 1655 >1655 
2003 310 521 676 818 946 1.077 1.222 1.399 1.706 >1706 
 
 
The debt increase has been rather similar among owner-occupiers between 30-39-years of age, as 
eir net liabilities have been nearly doubled in all deciles, except the first one. Not surprisingly, the 
ebt changes seem more uniform within this age group than for all the owner-occupiers. However, 
A similar development towards 
ousing wealth, net liability/income and net interest 
xpenditures/income are presented below. 
pared to housing wealth 
dva ge of g the ner-oc iers’ sing w th as aling or in order to analyze 
wn up  d ted ile
ding t  size heir n liabilit ousin alth r , i.e. r net ities  per
ir hou  wea n thei wn ho , flats d sum r cottages. For example 92,
abiliti r 70%  the ow ers we ess th 9% o eir ho g we  whi % w
 indeb Nega  net li ility /housing wealth ratios mean t the o s hav sitiv
gs in a ion t ir hou ng wea . 
 6.  
ner-o piers ludin he self-employe ivided to deciles by si  net litie
ent of sing th. 19 -2003.
1st
de
2n
de
3rd 
decile 
4th
de
5th
de
6th
de
7th
de
8th
de
9th
de
1
d
th
d
it is remarkable that the more serious debt increase started in 1994. 
increasing indebtedness is found for owner-occupiers below 30 years and 40-49 years of age. For 
older owners the development within the age group is more differentiated.8
 
Nevertheless, knowledge about the size of the debt is of limited value when the comparison 
includes neither the most important asset, the owner-occupied dwelling nor the income base for 
repaying the debt. Interest payments as part of the debt services are also lacking, but should be 
included. Therefore the ratios: net liability/h
e
 
 
7. Owner-occupiers’ net liabilities com
The a nta usin ow cup hou
e the o
eal
er-occ
a sc
iers are
fact
istributheir indebtedness, is utilised in Table 6, wher  in dec s 
accor o the  of t et y/h g we atio thei liabil  as a  cent 
of the sing lth i r o uses  an me in 19  the 
net li es fo  of n re l an 8 f th usin alth, le 30 ere 
more ted. tive ab hat wner e po e net 
savin ddit o the si lth
 
Table
All ow ccu  (exc g t d) d  in ze of liabi s as a 
per c  hou weal 87  
Year  
cile 
d 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
0th 
ecile 
1987 -46 -12 3 21 41 59 78 95 118 > 118 
1988 -53 -14 3 24 48 71 91 111 137 > 137 
1989 -50 -12 4 24 46 67 85 104 128 > 128 
1990 -58 -15 3 24 47 68 86 105 130 > 130 
1991 -67 -19 1 23 48 72 91 112 140 > 140 
1992 -66 -18 1 25 49 71 89 106 128 > 128 
1993 -68 -18 2 26 52 73 91 109 132 > 132 
1994 -69 -20 0 24 49 69 86 103 125 > 125 
1995 -71 -19 2 27 53 74 91 109 133 > 133 
1996 -64 -17 3 28 51 70 87 104 128 > 128 
1997 -55 -13 8 34 56 75 92 111 137 > 137 
1998 -54 -13 9 34 56 75 93 112 139 > 139 
                                                 
8 These results are not presented in the paper. 
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1999 -50 -11 9 33 53 70 87 105 129 > 129 
2000 -46 -10 10 32 51 68 84 101 124 > 124 
2001 -45 -11 9 30 49 66 82 99 123 > 123 
2002 -44 -9 11 33 51 68 84 101 125 > 125 
2003 -43 -9 11 32 51 68 84 101 125 > 125 
 
 
After a worsening of the owner-occupiers’ capital structure against higher indebtedness in the 
deciles with the highest debt from 1987 to 1988, the capital structure has been stabilized at the same
level for many years. Obviously the strong debt increase since 1994 must have been matched by a 
similar strong increase in the value of the owner-occupied properties, as the decile ratios are 
relatively stable. From 1996 to 1997 a minor worsening is met, due in part to an increase in the 
mortgage debt of about 4 percentage points in the higher deciles. The slight remaining decline 
could, possibly, be explained by the removal of the wealth tax and thereby the quality reduction of
the wealth statistic by the exclusion of physical assets like cars, boats, furniture, diamonds etc. If 
this is correct, the weak decrease in the values for the higher deciles after 1998 can be seen as a 
light im
 
 
provement of these owners’ indebtedness. 
-
 
ceptional year with higher equity ratios as the real 
ouse prices dropped by 11% from 1986H1 to 1987H1, and as the interest level was relatively 
table. On the other hand, besides the lower interest rates, the financial deregulation of the 1980s, 
n the debt 
 
 the stability in the Danish net liability/housing wealth ratio can be compared with other 
 
matic. 
 
s
 
With regard to the strong increase in prices for houses and flats since 1993, it seems rather 
surprising that solvency has not been improved to any great extent up to now. In all the years after 
1987 30% of the owner-occupiers have had net liabilities above 80% of their housing wealth. Even 
the 20% most indebted owners have had net liabilities above this assessment value and owners in 
the highest deciles have had a debt that exceeds the value of the property by more than 25-30%. 
However, even though the owner-occupiers’ ”true” capital structure is not depicted in Table 6, as 
the assessed property value is only a proxy for the ”true” market values, the remarkable feature is 
that the indicators for the capital structure have more or less have been the same throughout the 
years with steep price rises since 1994 as they were during the “housing market failure” in 1987
1993.  
 
For the years prior to 1987 no statistics on the distributions of debt across owner-occupier 
households are available in order to estimate whether the owner-occupiers’ capital structure 
expresses “normal” debt/equity ratios, or whether the structure is characterised by less equity than 
before. The study’s data from 1987 on are the first to be made available. House prices increased 
sharply for a few years up to 1986 (see Figure 1) and the interest dropped significantly. However, it
would be incorrect to surmise that 1987 was an ex
h
s
which led to the removal of restrictions on ordinary bank loans and on mortgages for owner-
occupiers had improved owner-occupiers’ access to raising more debt. An increase i
amounts is the only logical effect of the removal of such restrictions. Therefore, the assumption is 
that 1987 marked a transition to larger debt and debt-ratios for the owner-occupiers than before. 
 
However,
nations’ household debt/asset ratios. As mentioned above, Debelle (2004, p. 53) indicates that 
leverage ratios have generally risen for a few important countries. On the basis of this comparison
the stability in the Danish ratios is less dra
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8. O occu rs’ ne biliti ompa  to h ing w h, by . 
st he m r of de  size a ng variation according to age exists in the net 
abi usin ealth ratio. This structural variation is shown for 2003 in Table 7 but is quite 
imilar in the other year
Age – 
years ecil 
wner- pie t lia es c red ous ealt  age
Ju as in t atte bt  stro
li lity/ho g w
s s.  
 
Table 7.  
Owner-occupiers (excluding the self-employed) divided into deciles by size of net liabilities as a 
per cent of housing wealth, by age. 2003. 
1000 
families 1
st decile 2nd decile 3rd decile 4th decile 5th decile 6th decile 7th decile 8th decile 9th  decile 10th d
< 30 0  62.3 45 72 83 92 101 109 117 130 150 > 15
30-3 .6 37 59 73 84 93 103 113 127 149 > 149 9 217
40-4 257.9 9 35 51 64 75 86 98 112 135 > 135 9 
50-5 > 115 9 285.7 -25 1 20 35 49 61 75 91 115 
60-6 > 79 9 211.1 -67 -31 -13 0 13 26 40 57 79 
> 70 41  211.3 -120 -68 -42 -25 -13 -5 4 19 41 > 
All  125 1.246.0 -43 -9 11 32 51 68 84 101 125 >
 
Obviously, the variation in capital structure between the age groups is an argument for analysing 
each age group’s housing wealth, net liabilities and interest expenditures. The particular interest in 
young families’ access to the housing market and to owner-occupation in housing policy as well as 
the interest in the financial stability of the groups with the lowest equity and highest debt as well as
highest debt services are behind the focus on the owner-occupiers between 30-39 years of age in the
 
 
 
 
owners in this age group m ssu o h uch mm th e  in
mic s , and st be ected ave th ighest t liabi hous ealt ios. 
not be ble to duce t ents  for t ost p they
quire ry lar apita ins. Finally, a considerable propo  of p e in t ge g
 years ve moved into a family h e and all o d fl
, the liabil housi ealth ios for owner-occupiers between 9 ye f ag
n in T  8. 
  
 8. 
r-occ rs div d into iles b ze of iabil as a ent o using lth
r-occ rs (ex ding t elf-em yed) een 9 yea f age 7-20
1st
de
2nd
de
3rd
de
4th
de
5th
de
6th
de
7th
de
8th
de
9th
de
1
d
paper. 
 
In this age group 48.1% of the families (excluding the self-employed) were owner-occupiers in
2003 as compared with 15.5% in the age groups below 30 years. Since most owners in the age
 30  years  likely ve bo t thei perty only a few years before the year selected, group -39  are  ha
ay be a
ugh
med t
r pro
ave m  in co on wi first tim buyers  an 
econo ense  mu exp to h e h  ne lity/ ing w h rat They 
have en a  re he debt through ordinary instalm  and he m art,  have 
not ac d ve ge c l ga rtion eopl he a roup 
30-39  ha ous  have possibly sold their first sm wne at. 
Below net ity / ng w  rat  30-3 ars o e are 
show able
 
Table
Owne upie ide  dec y si net l ities per c f ho  wea . 
Owne upie clu he s plo betw 30-3 rs o . 198 03. 
Year  
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
0th 
ecile 
1987 25 46 60 71 81 91 101 115 138 > 138 
1988 30 56 73 85 96 107 119 134 160 > 160 
1989 29 53 69 81 91 100 112 125 148 > 148 
1990 29 57 72 84 94 105 116 131 154 > 154 
1991 34 63 79 91 102 113 126 141 166 > 166 
1992 39 65 79 90 99 108 118 129 150 > 150 
1993 40 67 82 92 102 111 121 134 157 > 157 
1994 37 64 77 86 95 104 114 126 147 > 147 
1995 38 67 81 92 101 111 121 135 160 > 160 
1996 36 63 76 87 96 105 116 129 153 > 153 
1997 44 68 82 93 102 113 124 138 163 > 163 
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1998 44 68 82 92 102 112 124 138 163 > 163 
1999 42 63 76 87 96 106 116 130 153 > 153 
2000 41 61 73 84 93 102 113 126 147 > 147 
2001 37 59 72 82 92 101 110 123 145 > 145 
2002 40 62 74 85 94 103 114 127 148 > 148 
2003 37 59 73 84 93 103 113 127 149 > 149 
 
Throughout the period 1988-2003, 40-50% of the owner-occupiers between 30-39 years of age had
a negative equity as their net liabilities had been larger than their housing wealth. Already at t
limit between the 2
 
he 
 and 3rd deciles owners in this age group have a net debt around 60% of the 
, 
e.  
 
le 17 below. Only a minor residual of the worsening may be due to the change in 
tatistical sources. 
 
 to make a larger down payment or to buy a 
 
 
 
refore, 
 as indicators of the correct capital structure. 
 fact, no one knows if the publicly assessed property price captures the market price for a property 
at the assessment time. Moreover, price rises or falls during the year can influence the ratios for the 
nd
housing wealth. And in the two highest deciles the debt lies around 30% or more above the housing 
wealth. Even though the measured capital structure only acts as an indicator for the “true” structure
there is no doubt that most 30-39 year-old owner-occupiers are as indebted as first time buyers ar
 
For owner-occupiers between 30-39 years of age the capital structure has not been improved in the
direction of a better equity ratio or on the contrary worsened as a higher debt ratio over the 15 years 
after 1987. Most of the worsening of the capital structure from 1996 to the higher ratios in 1997 can 
be explained by the increase in mortgage debt of about 5 percentage points in the single deciles as 
seen in Tab
s
  
The result that the age group containing most first time buyers has not improved its equity ratio is
no surprise as many owners must have bought their property after the steep price rises and must 
have financed their purchase by raising loans. Buyers with some savings beforehand must have 
been hit by the strong increase in house prices, so that their savings covered less of the price than 
earlier. This problem was reduced for buyers who “traded up”, realising some capital gains on the 
former owner-occupied dwelling and thereby being able
more expensive house. The last group seems to account for a minority of owners in the 30-39 years 
age group. 
 
The capital structures for owner-occupiers in the other age groups are presented in Appendix A. An 
inspection of data gives the impression that also among the other age groups below 60 years the
capital structure remains mostly unchanged over the years. In contrast, owner-occupiers between 
60-69 years of age have been more indebted as the capital structure had worsened for owners with 
positive net savings and for owners with very low debt. In general, the stability of the single age 
groups’ capital structure harmonises with the fact that the “average” capital structure for all owners 
has not been changed through the period, see Table 6.  
 
The conclusion must be that negative equity seems to exist as a rather permanent feature among 
owner-occupiers in the Danish house and flat markets. 
 
9. Publicly assessed property value as a proxy for owner-occupied house and flat market 
prices. 
The use of the publicly assessed property values of 1 January for the same year as proxies for the
markets prices at the end of the year of owner-occupied houses, flats, farm houses and summer
cottages has been necessary as most houses and flats are not put on the market each year. The
he data for the owner-occupiers’ capital structure actt
In
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capital structure as the net liabilities for taxation purposes are calculated at the end of the year (see
the next section). 
The tax authorities assess the value of houses, flats and summer cottages by multiple regression 
analysis, in which the value of a number of characteristics is determined by properties sold. These 
values are used for the assessment of each flat and house. The appraised values are adjusted for the
last year’s property price change on 1 January each year. In accordance with Danish law, the
publicly assessed values must be set at market prices. 
 
 
 
% 
e 
t the market prices for houses sold during the first half year are on average about 10% above 
e publicly assessed property values, as seen in Table 9. Of course, the average of the differences 
e estimated for the years when the property values on 1 January  of the same year have 
ty price rises or falls during the first half year. 
  
Th ra  th s f ld h y 
property va  with r’s transaction  of the e. 
On average the publicly assessed property value is closer to the seller’s proceeds than the m  
pr
 
Table 9. 
The average spread between the market prices for sold houses and their publicly assessed property 
value. 1st half year 1987-2002. 
1  Market verage 
assessed property value 
Year lic 
n 1 
January  
1
year 
Market p average 
percentage above publicly 
assessed property value 
Year blic 
assessment on 1 
January  
 
Over the decades, houses have been sold around the assessment times at average prices about 10
above the publicly assessed property value in accordance with the sale price statistics. However, the 
variation is considerable from house to house. An inspection of the sale price statistics confirms th
fact tha
th
can only b
been used. Some of the variation in the annual averages can be explained by changes in the 
assessment policy and by proper
e ave ge 10% spread between
lues can be compared
e market price
the selle
or so ouses and their publicl
costs, typically 7-8%
assessed 
sale pric
arket
ice. 
st  half
year percentage above publicly 
b
assessment o
price a  for pu st half rice  for pu
1987 4% 1986 1995 18% 1992 
1988 4% 1986 1996 11% 1996 
1989 6% 1986 1997 21% 1996 
1990 - 2% 1986 1998 14% 1998 
1991 - 2% 1986 1999 15% 1999 
1992 5% 1992 2000 6% 2000 
1993 - 2% 1992 2001 11% 2001 
1994 13% 1992 2002 9% 2002 
Source: Told og Skat, Ejendomssalg (Customs and Tax, Property sales). 
 
In the 2nd half year, 2003, houses were traded at a price that was on average 
 
9% above the publicly 
ssessed property value for 1 October 2003 according to the property price statistics.  
 
r-
me 
dwellings. 
a
 
In the 1st half year, 2002 and 2nd half year 2003, the market prices for owner-occupied flats were
19% and 14% respectively above their publicly assessed property value. A major part of the 
explanation for these higher differences in values could be the rather strong price rises for owne
occupied flats during the later years, which makes more precise assessments difficult. Also, so
owner-occupied flats that have formerly been private rented dwellings have been rented out and 
assessed at a much lower property price level as rented property. Flats, farmhouses and summer 
cottages cover only a minor part of the stock of owner-occupied 
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The exactness of the publicly assessed property values is regarded with suspicion in the market. 
Most real estate agents find the assessed values too low and argue that they do not take market 
conditions sufficiently into account. However, it is difficult to look away from the statistical 
averages in Table 9 and from the fact that public assessments are based on a much larger set of 
market data than any specific property assessment in the market. No documentation exists to 
support the notion that the “market’s valuation” - i.e. often a real estate agent’s valuation - should 
e more precise than the public assessment. Similarly, the mortgage banks’ estimates of property 
e, the 
 
ale prices and publicly assessed 
roperty values according to both municipal location and property value group. 
 the only 
t values of the stock of owner-occupied dwellings, b) the publicly 
e 
too. 
he net 
piers’ net liabilities/ housing wealth ratios to the 
evelopment over the years. 
ation of the owner-occupiers’ capital structure based on tax data implies that the net 
o poor in years when the property prices increase during the year. In Table 10 a simple 
ctio ent through the year has been done by deflating the ratio with the 
ind r s am se  fr  ha  to  ha r fo ea
2002 ld og t, 200 . 
 10. 
r-occ rs div d into iles according to the size of net li ities per c of h  
h. Ow -occu s (exc ing th lf-employed) between 3  year ge. -20
cted d le lim ith th se in le-fam  hous ces f nd ha r – 2
ear. 
1st
de
2nd
de
3rd
de
4th
de
5th
de
6th
de
7th
de
8th
de
9th
de
1
d
b
values when a loan is accepted cannot be proved on the market. 
 
No matter how well the publicly assessed property value on average captures the market valu
variance in the relative difference from sale to sale is substantial. A consequence must be that many
houses and flats are sold at prices well above the publicly assessed property value, just as many are 
sold at prices close to the assessed value or – rarely – even below the assessed value. This view is 
confirmed by a certain variation in the average difference between s
p
 
Therefore, in conclusion it may be stated that a) the publicly assessed property values are
possible measure for the marke
assessed property values are really good indicators of the market values, and c) the relative 
differences between market values and publicly assessed property values seem to have been stabl
for an even longer period than 1987-2003 and the – high – variances seem to have been stable, 
Therefore, the publicly assessed property value may have the same quality as an indicator of t
liability/housing wealth ratios throughout the period of this study.  
 
 
10. Corrections of the owner-occu
d
The calcul
liabilities at the end of the year are compared with the value of owner-occupied properties at the 
beginning of the year. The owner-occupiers’ solvency – with regard to the size of the equity – 
thereby becomes too good in years when property prices are falling. In contrast, the solvency 
becomes to
corre n for the price developm
iceprice s fo ing fle- ily u ho  pr sice om nd 2 lf y rea  th nde 2 lf yea r the y rs 
1987- (To Ska 4a)
 
Table
Owne upie ide  dec abil as a ent ousing
wealt ner pier lud e se 0-39 s of a 1987 03. 
Corre eci its w e ri sing ily e pri or 2 lf yea nd 
half y
Year  
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
0th 
ecile 
1987 27 49 64 75 86 97 107 122 147 > 147 
1988 29 54 71 82 93 104 115 130 155 > 155 
1989 30 55 71 84 94 104 115 129 153 > 153 
1990 31 61 77 89 100 112 124 140 164 > 164 
1991 33 62 77 89 99 111 123 138 162 > 162 
1992 41 69 83 95 105 114 125 136 158 > 158 
1993 38 64 78 88 98 106 116 128 150 > 150 
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1994 35 60 72 81 89 98 107 118 138 > 138 
1995 34 60 73 83 91 100 109 122 144 > 144 
1996 33 57 70 79 88 96 106 118 140 > 140 
1997 41 63 76 86 94 104 115 128 151 > 151 
1998 39 60 73 82 91 99 110 122 145 > 145 
1999 38 57 69 79 87 96 105 118 139 > 139 
2000 39 57 69 79 88 96 107 119 139 > 139 
2001 35 56 68 78 87 95 104 116 137 > 137 
2002 38 59 71 81 90 99 109 121 142 > 142 
2003* 37 59 73 84 93 103 113 127 149 > 149 
* The 2003 values are not corrected at the public property assessment was set through at 1 October 2003. 
 
The correction for the price development implies that the limits for the four highest deciles with 
39 
he 
ing 
s can 
 the families in 
e age group in the price rise period. 
l 
ake 
een in Table 11 for owner-occupiers between 30-39 years of age.  
t 
ade some figure difficult to explain (Lunde, 1990). Obviously, the size of the owner-occupier’s 
nce the size of interest expenditures, and by this the net income. If net incomes had been 
technical insolvency represent to a large extent the weakening prices from 1987 to 1993 and the 
sharp price rise afterwards. As negative equity existed in the 6th decile, too, the corrected values 
imply that negative equity was somewhat more widespread among owner-occupiers between 30-
years of age through the “housing market failure” 1987-1993 than in the years after. Therefore, t
corrected ratios seem to be in better harmony with the cycles in the Danish economy and hous
market than the non-corrected values. Although changes in capital structure between the year
e seen in the first period, negative equity is the situation faced by more than 30% ofb
th
 
Even though the correction’s influence on the net liability/housing wealth ratios must be kept in 
mind, such corrections have not been realised in general. Methodologically the correction is 
dubious, as the statistics in the paper cover individual owner-occupiers, whose price rise for the 
single house or flat is influenced by regional, local and individual factors, so that the individua
price rise could be far above or far below the average rate. Also, the variability in individual 
property price growth rates is much higher than for average growth rates.   
 
 
11. The variation in owner-occupiers’ capital structure, by income. 
It may be expected that the owner-occupiers’ capital structure varies with income. The assumption 
could be that owner-occupiers with lower incomes have less savings before buying and have to t
out additional loans in order to continue to hold the dwelling. Or the assumption might on the 
contrary be that families with higher incomes can more easily raise mortgages to finance the 
buying, and that their debt-asset ratios are therefore higher than for families with lower incomes. 
The variation by income in the net liability/housing wealth ratio – or rather lack of variation – is 
s
 
The income definition used is the sum of “personal income” plus “positive capital income” and 
represents gross incomes without any deductions. Earlier, for 1988, results for a net income concep
after taxable deductions had been presented, but especially the right to deduct interest expenses 
m
debt influe
used in Table 11, the most indebted owners would have been allocated to the rows with lower 
incomes.  
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A distribution of wn cu ac g om ot de e a ould be 
difficult to interpret without considering the age of the owners.9 Therefore, the variation in the 
owner-occupiers’ ital res after income h  only en sh n fo ne twe 0-3
years of age in Table 11. 
 
Table 11. 
30-39 year-old owner-occupiers (excluding the self-employed) divided in ze o  lia es 
a per cent of housing wealth, by income. 2003. 
P
ow
de de de de de
all o er-oc piers cordin to inc e is n  inclu d her s it w
cap structu ave  be ow r ow rs be en 3 9 
to si f net biliti as 
Income 
DKK 
ct of 
all 
ners 
1st     
cile 
2nd     
cile 
3rd     
cile 
4th     
cile 
5th     
cile 
6th     
decile 
7th     
decile 
8th     
decile 
9th     
decile 
10th       
decile 
<100,000 0.2 -33 9 40 56 70 82 94 114 139 > 139 
100,000-149,999 0.2 0 31 48 65 77 89 102 120 147 > 147 
150,000-199,999 0.4 0 45 61 76 84 90 100 112 140 > 140 
200,000-249,999 0.7 11 42 57 69 79 90 102 113 139 > 139 
250,000-299,999 1.0 18 43 57 69 79 87 98 113 131 > 131 
300,000-349,999 1.0 25 50 65 79 89 100 110 122 150 > 150 
350,000-399,999 1.0 34 60 76 86 95 107 117 128 151 > 151 
400,000-499,999 1.5 36 64 78 88 97 107 116 130 154 > 154 
450,000-599,999 6.3 46 66 80 90 99 109 119 133 156 > 156 
>600,000 5.1 41 60 73 82 91 100 110 124 145 > 145 
Total 17.5 37 59 73 84 93 103 113 127 149 > 149 
 
A high degree of uniformity among the owner-occupiers’ capital structure is met at the single 
income levels. The few owner-occupiers in the groups with lower incomes mean that the connection
should be interpreted with care. However, owner-occupiers with incomes below 350,000 DKK hav
lower net liability/housing wealth ratio than the average for the age group. In contrast, the two larg
groups of owner-occupiers with incomes between 400,000-600,000 DKK have higher than av
ratios and the owners in the highes
 
e 
e 
erage 
t income group have a slightly lower than average debt ratio. 
s between 30 and 39 years of age account for 17.5% of all owner-occupiers. Two thirds 
robably 
arely – one high i ome from one member owe e fe owner  the l est in e deciles 
make the distribution according to income in Table 11 unsatisfactory ad 0- r-o
ier families are d eciles accord  to g inco n Ta 2 f
able 13 r 200 his m od help ke a comparison of the distribution 
s more ning   
s as a p ent o using alth thin speci ecile vide cord o g
es. 30-3 ar-o wner cup  (exc ng th lf-em ed) 0. 
1st 2nd 3 4th 5th 6th 7t 8 9
 
The owner
of the age group are situated in the three highest income groups, which indicates that a large 
proportion of the families in this age group must have incomes from two persons or – p
r nc . H ver th w s in ow com
. Inste , the 3 39 yea ld 
owner-occup ivided below into d ing ross me i ble 1 or 
1990 and in T  fo 3. T eth can  ma
between year mea ful.
 
Table 12. 
Net liabilitie er c f ho  we  wi the fic d s, di d ac ing t ross 
income decil 9 ye ld o -oc iers ludi e se ploy . 199
 rd he th th 10th
                                                 
9 Distributions of all ow
1999b). 
n cupi fter in e an tal s ure h een p ted e un 90er-oc ers a com d capi truct ave b resen arlier (L de, 19 , 
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decile decile decil decil decile decile decile decile decile decile 
1. income decile  1 34 57 71 83 95 109 123 148 > 148 
2. income decile 20 42 65 76 86 95 103 117 144 > 144 
3. income decile 15 47 63 79 89 102 114 130 155 > 155 
4. income decile 21 56 71 82 91 103 115 134 155 > 155 
5. income decile 33 61 74 84 94 105 114 129 152 > 152 
6. income decile 33 59 75 86 96 105 116 128 150 > 150 
7. income decile 41 63 76 86 97 106 116 130 150 > 150 
8. income decile 40 65 78 90 99 110 121 134 152 > 152 
9. income decile 45 66 81 90 99 107 118 134 155 > 155 
10. income decile 40 68 82 93 106 115 129 146 174 > 174 
All 30-39 year-old  
owner-occupiers 
29 57 72 84 94 105 116 131 154 > 154 
 
For 1990 and 2003 as well as for all the other years studied in the paper, the distribution of the ne
liability/housing wealth ratios in the deciles is close to identical for all the income deciles. In other 
words, the size of the owner-occupier family’s income has no significant influence on the family’s
solvency, but of course the income influences the property value the family can afford to buy. In 
terms of methodology it must be remembered that the data are based upon samples, which 
intuitively seems to be the best explanation of th
t 
 
e small differences in the structures. However, the 
tios – but not the distribution – vary a little more between the years as already seen in Table 8. 
Lunde 1990 
nd 1999 b). Also se co ctions dica hat m y own occup s buy ir firs ouse o at 
without any substantial saving in th rs e a t th n ent nta em
f the in me si ore r, th nne n ind e a p l con atio the
ly raised  real te agents that “people buy what they ffor buy . th
pensiv ouse flat a ey c pay f n th is o ir in . Al an
omers on request how expensive an owner-occupied flat or house the fami n a
t financ  Whe alua  the btor’s economy, the banks rely e he  o
e. 
 as a p ent o using alth thin speci ecile vide cord o g
3 ear-ol wner .  
1st
decile 
2nd
decile 
3
decil 
4th
decil 
5th
decile 
6th
decile 
7t
decile 
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9
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10
decile 
ra
 
The data indicate that income size is of little importance for the net liability ratio during recent 
years as “normal” income groups seem to be a little more indebted that the others (see 
a the nne  in te t an er- ier  the t h r fl
e yea befor nd tha e dow paym  perce ge se  to be 
independent o co ze. M ove e co ctio icat artia firm n of  
point typical  by esta can a d to ”, i.e ey 
buy just as ex e a h  or s th an or o e bas f the come so, b ks 
tell their cust ly ca fford 
to buy and ge ed. n ev ting  de  quit avily n the 
family incom
 
Table 13. 
Net liabilities er c
9 y
f ho
d o
 we
-occupiers (excluding the self-employed)
 wi the f dic s, di d ac
 2003.
ing t ross 
income deciles. 30-
 rd he th th th
1. income decile  3 41 57 70 80 90 101 114 140 > 140 
2. income decile 21 46 60 71 84 94 104 116 141 > 141 
3. income decile 33 59 75 86 95 107 116 127 148 > 148 
4. income decile 44 67 80 90 101 110 119 136 161 > 161 
5. income decile 46 65 79 89 100 110 120 132 161 > 161 
6. income decile 47 70 82 92 99 112 122 136 157 > 157 
7. income decile 48 66 79 88 97 105 117 131 150 > 150 
8. income decile 46 64 75 84 94 104 114 127 146 > 146 
9. income decile 41 65 75 84 93 101 112 125 146 > 146 
10. income decile 34 54 68 78 86 94 103 119 141 > 141 
All 30-39 year-old  
owner-occupiers 
37 59 73 84 93 103 113 127 149 > 149 
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As the distribution of the owner-occupiers according to net liability/housing wealth ratio is nearly
identical in the income deciles, the conclusion that differences in income do not result in differences 
in the capital structure is strengthened – a
 
nd is a surprising result of this study. 
e.  
, the expectation may be that their capital structure varies with housing wealth, which acts as 
 security for the mortgage since the lender can acquire the property at a foreclosure if the owner 
rvice the debt. Therefore, the property value could have some affect on whether the 
. 
, nearly everyone raises mortgage up to the maximum within the limits of the 
c 0% r lo raisi  Aft ards e sa LTV le is  effe e m um 
f l e
 
In Tables 14 and 15 below owner-occupiers between 30-39 years of age and 40-49 years of age 
r have been ded e s ac ding to their housing wealth (the value of their 
o  an ve b  dis ute rding to their net ilit s alth 
r
 
T
Net liabilities as a per cent of housing wealth within the specific deciles and divided into deciles by 
the size of housing wealth (property value).30  yea d ow r-oc iers clu th
Publicly assessed  pro- 
1000 DKK 
1st 
deci 
2nd 
decile 
3rd 
decile 
4th 
decile 
5th 
decile 
6th 
decile 
7th 
decile 
8th 
decile 
9th 
decile 
10th 
decile 
 
 
12. The variation in owner-occupiers’ capital structure, by (publicly assessed) property valu
Even though the owner-occupiers’ capital structure did not vary with income in the younger age 
groups
a
does not se
owner-occupier has raised and can raise loans. Also, more high income owner-occupiers as well as 
more wealthy owner-occupiers could be expected to borrow less compared to the property value
However at buying
urrent LTV rule of 8
or the new mortgage 
 fo
oan to
an 
 be rais
ng.
d.  
erw , th me  ru  the ctiv axim
espectively divi  into d cile cor
wner-occupied dwellings) d ha een trib d acco  liab y/hou ing we
atio.  
able 14. 
-39 r-ol ne cup  (ex ding e self-
employed). 2003. 
perty value, 
1. < 490 11 57 79 96 114 127 144 167 219 > 219 
2. 490 - 640 35 66 86 97 111 122 140 159 185 > 185 
3. 640 - 770 43 66 84 96 107 116 128 143 164 > 164 
4. 770 - 890 43 65 83 93 10 11 12 13 15 > 11 1 1 1 2 52 
5. 890 - 1,000 43 64 78 89 101 110 118 128 142 > 142 
6. 1,000 - 1,150 47 67 79 87 95 103 111 122 136 > 136 
7. 1,150 - 1,400 44 61 73 84 92 99 107 116 133 > 133 
8. 1,400 - 1,650 43 60 70 78 84 92 98 106 119 > 119 
9. 1,650 – 2,150 31 51 64 72 78 84 91 100 114 > 114 
10. > 2,150 20 37 50 59 68 77 85 93 106 > 106 
 
 
T
Net liabilities as a per cent of housing wealth within the specific deciles and divided into deciles by 
the size of housing wealth (property value).40  yea d ow r-oc iers clu  th -
able 15.  
-49 r-ol ne cup  ( ex ding e self
employed). 2003. 
Publicly assessed  pro-
perty value, 1000 DKK 
1st 
deci 
2nd 
decile 
3rd 
decile 
4th 
decile 
5th 
decile 
6th 
decile 
7th 
decile 
8th 
decile 
9th 
decile 
10th 
decile 
1. < 490 -18 22 53 76 94 109 127 153 188 > 188 
2. 490 - 640 3 39 62 83 95 107 120 138 166 > 166 
3. 640 - 770 16 39 63 77 90 103 117 131 153 > 153 
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4. 770 - 890 17 47 63 76 88 100 112 125 141 > 141 
5. 890 – 1,000 10 38 53 68 79 90 100 114 131 > 131 
6. 1,000 – 1,150 18 45 58 68 78 88 98 109 128 > 128 
7. 1,150 – 1,400 14 38 54 65 75 85 95 108 122 > 122 
8. 1,400 – 1,650 12 36 49 59 68 77 86 95 109 > 109 
9. 1,650 - 2,150 18 34 46 54 62 70 78 88 103 > 103 
10. > 2,150 2 24 37 47 56 64 73 83 99 > 99 
 
In Table 7 it was shown that the net liability/housing wealth ratio falls with increasing age and here
too, the ratio is remarkably lower for owner-occupiers between 40-49 years of age in Table 15 th
for owners between 30-39 years of age in Table 14.  
 
Rather
, 
an 
 interestingly for both age groups is that the net liability/housing wealth ratio decreases 
 
 of “true” market 
alues. Where the spread between these two value concepts seem low on average (see Table 9), the 
igh. The influence of the 
e 
s 
e debt is the most important single item, besides the housing wealth,  
 
 
en totally dominated up to 2000, the size of the debt has in general increased 
gister 
rs.  
 to be 80% during the years of the study. The mortgage banks are allowed to 
ation. In practice, the property price 
at the time of the turnover is a pted he ma t valu hen t ortga is tak ut, w  the 
strongly with increasing property value. The strong dependency is simply not trustworthy. In fact, it 
seems impossible to argue that the size of housing wealth really has a strong influence on the net 
liability/housing wealth ratio. Such a dependency would be overshadowed by the suggestion that 
the result mostly expresses the fact that the limitation included in the study, i.e. the use of publicly
assessed property values as values for the owner-occupied properties instead
v
variance in the spread between the single families’ values can be rather h
“wrong” assessments on the content of Tables 14 and 15 becomes apparent in two ways: a) a 
property with a “too low” property value will be placed in “too low” deciles, and b) a “too low” 
publicly assessed property value lowers the denominator in the ratio found and thereby increases th
ratio. 
 
A consequence of this methodological restriction is that the property market value’s possible, “true” 
influence on the net liability/housing wealth ratio cannot be identified. However, as the income doe
not influence the owner-occupiers’ capital structure, the hypothesis must be that the value of the 
owners’ properties do not influence their distribution after capital structure. 
 
 
13. Owner-occupiers’ mortgage debt compared to housing wealth 
The owner-occupiers’ mortgag
in their capital structure. The owners-occupiers’ mortgage debt is close to three times as big in the 
aggregate as the debt on their loans in commercial banks – both inclusive and exclusive the self-
employed owners. Other loan sources are quantitatively unimportant. 
 
The tax statistics are of the owner-occupiers’ mortgage debt at market values. Figures do not exist
for the year 1994. As all mortgages for owner-occupied dwellings carried fixed interest rate from
1987 to 1996 and ev
considerably as a consequence of the falling interest rates through the period, as described in 
Section 3. The personal wealth tax was written on net wealth, calculated at market values, and 
mortgage debt at market prices is therefore found in the tax statistics up to 1996 and in the re
data for the following yea
 
When a loan is raised, the maximum LTV for mortgage loans to owner-occupied dwellings has been 
determined by law
estimate the market value of the property as part of their credit valu
cce as t rke e w he m ge en o hile
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mortgage banks’ es on of marke s res e when the l isi m  
e hdrawal.  
In Table 16 below, all the ow r-occ rs ha een divided i decil ccor to t  of 
their mortg  debt/ using alth r , whi o age L  for
outstanding mortgages.  
T 6.  
Owner-occ rs di d int eciles accordi to the r mor ge de as a ent of 
housing wealth.  
All owner-o piers (excludi  se ploy . 1987 003. 
1st ile 
de d  d  d  d  d  d  d  
timati t price i  more trictiv oan ra ng rese bles an
quity wit
ne upie ve b nto es a ding he size
age ho  we atio ch can be regarded as a m rtg TV  the 
able 1
upie vide o d ng  size of thei tga bt   cper
ccu ng the lf-em ed)  – 2  
Year dec 2nd 
cile 
3rd 
ecile
4th 
ecile
5th 
ecile
6th 
ecile
7th 
ecile
8th 
ecile
9th 
ecile
10  th
decile 
1987 0 2 14 25 38 52 65 76 91 > 91 
1988 0 4 17 30 46 63 77 89 107 > 107 
1989 0 4 17 29 44 60 73 84 100 > 100 
1990 0 5 17 30 46 62 74 85 101 > 101 
1991 0 5 17 31 50 67 80 92 10 > 109 9 
1992 0 4 16 31 49 64 74 84 95 > 95 
1993 0 4 16 34 53 68 78 88 101 > 101 
1994 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
1995 0 3 17 40 58 70 79 89 104 > 104 
1996 0 3 18 40 55 67 76 86 100 > 100 
1997 0 3 20 42 58 70 80 90 104 > 104 
1998 0 3 22 43 58 70 81 91 105 > 105 
1999 0 2 22 41 55 66 75 84 96 > 96 
2000 0 2 22 40 52 63 72 81 92 > 92 
2001 0 1 21 38 51 62 72 82 94 > 94 
2002 0 1 22 40 53 65 75 84 95 > 95 
2003 0 1 24 41 55 67 77 86 97 > 97 
 
The mortgage debt/housing wealth ratios – the mortgage LTV structure – in Table 16 reveals that 
about 20% of the owner-occupiers have no mortgage debt and – at the other end of the scale – 
another 20% have a mortgage LTV above 80% of the publicly assessed property value. Obviously 
enough, no rules exist and no mortgage bank demands that an owner-occupier must reduce the 
outstanding mortgage balance after a house price drop or an interest change, because the debto
TV de facto increases above 80%. 
r’s 
When considering the LTVs it must be remembered that the 
ould 
all 
ution of the owner-occupiers according to mortgage LTVs 
L
estimated LTVs are based on the publicly assessed property values, not the market values. It sh
also be emphasised that nothing indicates that the mortgage banks are breaking the legal maximum 
LTV of 80% when lending even though they face tough competition. 
 
The increase in the mortgage LTV from 1987 to 1988 was caused by an increase in the market 
value of the debt as interest rates dropped by around 2-3 percentage points, and by a house price f
of 5-6% during 1987. The relative stability in general in mortgage LTVs in subsequent years is 
rather remarkable. First, during the “housing market failure” up to 1993, the long interest rates went 
up and down and the nominal house prices dropped in some years - and by 20% on the whole from 
987 to 1993. However, the distrib1
remained more or less unchanged.  
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Since 1993 the owner-occupiers’ nominal mortgage debt has risen, as seen in Tables 1 and 2, 
because of the debt increase on fixed interest mortgages following interest rate drops, because of the 
liberalisation of the access for owner-occupiers to raise a mortgage, and because the huge 
prepayments in 1993-1994 were often combined with a minor extra loan proceed when financing 
the prepayment. However, the resulting mortgage LTVs in the higher decile numbers remained 
unchanged until 1998, when the LTV values were reduced remarkably. In the 3rd-5th deciles, th
mortgage LTVs have been increased somehow since 1993, which possibly could be partly 
explained by the deregulation in 1992-1993, when families who were owner-occupiers already were 
allowed to raised new mortgages. 
 
e 
everal factors may have contributed to the stability in the mortgage LTVs as the mortgages have 
ded to follow the increasing house prices and property values. First, financing of housing 
e seen as creating a higher market value for the fixed interest mortgages that had 
 increased 
fu  a saction costs on rep ent and at the time the n wa ised w e add o the 
new mortgage deb ird  re in xe es  to tab  m es 
with lower debt services has been in effect esp ally f  2000 on and often such refinancing is 
supplemented with some equity withdrawal. F th, af the de ulati  199 , o
occupiers refinanced commercial bank loans, chase y m tgag d no gan
consumer credit to the mortgage loans. And fifth, equity withdrawal by owner-occupiers in order to 
raise money for consumer purposes, which were formerly financed by the other and more expensive 
fi al so es sh  not verlo d. 
 
T 7.  
Owner-occ rs di d into deciles according to the e of t  mor e de s a ent of 
housing wealth.  
Owner-occ rs (e ding lf-e oyed) tween 39 ye  of age. 1987 – 2003. 
1st le 
d  d  d  d  d  d  d  d  
S
been expan
turnovers at still higher prices works against higher mortgage debt. Second, over time the lowering 
interest rates wer
been prepaid at price 100 to lower future debt service, and the higher debt value had been
rther s the tran aym
financ
 loa
t loans
s ra
 adjus
er
le-rate
ed t
ortgagt.10 Th , mass g of fi d inter
eci rom
our ter reg on in 2-93 wner-
pur -mone or es an n-or ised 
nanci urc ould be o oke
able 1
upie vide  siz heir tgag bt a  per c
upie xclu the se mpl  be  30- ars  
Year  deci 2nd 
ecile
3rd 
ecile
4th 
ecile
5th 
ecile
6th 
ecile
7th 
ecile
8th 
ecile
9th 
ecile
10th 
decile 
1987 19 36 49 58 66 72 79 88 103 > 103 
1988 26 46 61 71 79 86 94 104 123 > 123 
1989 26 46 59 68 75 81 88 98 115 > 115 
1990 29 50 62 71 77 83 90 100 117 > 117 
1991 34 58 70 77 84 90 98 109 127 > 127 
1992 37 58 67 74 79 84 89 96 107 > 107 
1993 43 61 71 78 83 88 94 102 114 > 114 
1994 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
1995 47 63 71 77 82 88 94 103 118 > 118 
1996 44 60 67 74 79 85 91 98 113 > 113 
1997 47 63 72 79 85 90 96 104 118 > 118 
1998 47 64 73 79 85 90 96 104 118 > 118 
1999 47 60 68 74 79 84 89 96 108 > 108 
2000 44 57 65 71 76 81 86 93 104 > 104 
2001 41 57 65 72 77 82 88 94 107 > 107 
2002 43 59 68 75 80 84 90 97 110 > 110 
2003 42 59 70 76 81 86 91 98 111 > 111 
                                                 
10 For new and refinanced loans this effect was reduced by the mortgage banks had started only to accept new mortgage 
loans, raised at prices close below 100, just in order to lower the possible increase in debt at further interest rate drops.  
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Of course, mortgage LTVs also vary considerably with age. In Table 17 the ratios are seen for 
owner-occupiers between 30-39-years of age and naturally seen in a lifetime-perspective, these ratios 
are somehow higher than for all the owner-occupiers as seen in Table 16. Furthermore, Table 17 
exposes the fact that it is very unusual for young owner-occupier families to not have mortgages. Ev
the first decile limit was 42% in 2003. In the same year half of the owners in the age group had a 
mortgage LTV above 80% and nearly 20% had a ratio above 100%. In general, the distribution of 
ratios over the years seems to h
en 
ave been rather similar but at slightly reduced LTVs after 1998. 
owever, the direction of change in the mortgage LTVs has been reversed in 2002 and 2003.11  
elow 30 years of age is quite 
er 
t 
f age, 
4. Owner-occupiers’ net liabilities compared to their gross income. 
 
r home for the family. An owner with 
egative equity following a sale will have an unsecured debt, which will reduce or even obstruct the 
elow, the owner-occupiers’ debt is compared with their income, which forms the basis for paying 
itures are 
vices is based 
n their income. For the family and the lender, the family income is the most important factor in the 
                               
H
 
The level and distribution of mortgage LTVs among owner-occupiers b
similar to the ratios in Table 17,12 indicating that these mortgage LTVs can express the situation for 
first time buyers. The mortgage LTVs are on a markedly lower level for owner-occupiers in the old
age groups, not only for the highest deciles but also for the rest. Especially the deregulation made i
possible to offer mortgage loans to families who were owner-occupiers already, as a form of equity 
withdrawal loan. The effect can be seen to a minor degree in the ratios for owner-occupiers between 
40-49 and 50-59 years of age and more pronouncedly for owners in the age group 60-69 years o
but not for the oldest owners. 
 
 
1
Above, the changes and distributions of owner-occupiers’ debt have been combined with the value 
of their properties. This results in a crucial ratio for the owner-occupier, who can release his/her
debt by selling the property and buying or renting anothe
n
access to raise new loans to finance the purchase of a new house. For the lender, the property acts as 
a security for the loan as the lender can appropriate the property through a foreclosure if the 
borrower does not pay on time. An owner-occupier family’s repayment of loans by selling and 
moving from their home in order to “trade down” to a cheaper house or rent, is a high-price option 
for the family.  
 
B
the debt services on the loans. After this section the owner-occupiers’ interest expend
analysed and are directly compared with their incomes. 
 
Obviously the family’s preferred alternative of continuing to pay the ordinary debt ser
o
decision to accept to raise a loan and for the loan size – and for servicing the debt in subsequent 
years. Therefore, the distribution and development in the owner-occupiers’ net liability/income ratio 
is presented in Tables 18 and 19 below. Still, the income is the family’s gross income, defined as 
the sum of “personal income” and “positive net capital income”. 
 
                  
e data for 2004 indicate that mortgage-LTV should have been changed. On the contrary, the continued low 
interest rate level, the refinancing activity and not least the mortgage loan statistics indicate that the size of the LTV has 
been maintained. 
12 The mortgage LTVs for the other age groups are not presented in this paper. The research plan is to write a paper: 
“Mortgage Loan-to-Values at Market Prices for Danish Owner-Occupiers during the Bust and Boom Period 1987-
2003” in which these mortgage LTVs will be analysed separately. 
11 None of th
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The net liability/income ratio together with the housing wealth/income form the net 
liability/housing wealth ratio, which was presented above as 
wealth ) = (net liability/income om usi alt
al pri r ho  dropp  throu the ye 1987 993 a ave ased e, th
ng w inco atios y have followed a similar trend. Therefore with stable distributions 
 net ty/ho g wea  ratios from year to year, the expectation must be that the housing 
h/inc atio re or l s have d the sam hs as net l ty/in e ra
.13
 18. 
ner- iers ludin e self-employe ivide by si  net litie
ent of s inc . 198 03.  
1
d
2n
de
3rd
de
4th
de
5th
de
6th
de
7th
de
8th
de
9th
de
1
d
 
     (net liability/housing ) · (inc e / ho ng we h) 
 
As re ces fo uses ed gh ars  to 1 nd h incre  sinc e 
housi ealth/ me r ma
of the liabili usin lth
wealt ome r s mo es  followe e pat  the iabili com tios 
below
 
Table
All ow occup  (exc g th d) d d into deciles ze of liabi s as a 
per c  gros ome 7-20
Year st 
ecile 
d 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
0th 
ecile 
1987 -147 -37 7 45 79 111 143 178 229 > 229 
1988 -149 -38 8 48 84 116 148 184 238 > 238 
1989 -141 -35 9 47 81 113 143 177 228 > 228 
1990 -150 -39 6 44 77 106 134 166 216 > 216 
1991 -165 -44 2 39 72 100 129 160 207 > 207 
1992 -172 -42 3 42 75 103 129 159 203 > 203 
1993 -170 -42 4 43 77 106 133 164 211 > 211 
1994 -159 -43 1 38 70 96 121 147 186 > 186 
1995 -159 -41 3 43 77 104 132 160 204 > 204 
1996 -161 -41 6 48 83 113 140 172 216 > 216 
1997 -153 -33 17 61 96 127 157 192 242 > 242 
1998 -154 -33 20 66 103 135 165 201 253 > 253 
1999 -152 -31 22 69 105 137 168 202 254 > 254 
2000 -155 -30 25 72 109 140 172 208 263 > 263 
2001 -156 -33 23 71 108 140 172 208 263 > 263 
2002 -152 -28 29 78 116 149 181 220 280 > 280 
2003 -157 -30 32 81 119 152 185 224 287 > 287 
 
The distribution of all the owner-occupiers according to their net liability/income ratio for the years 
1987-2003 is seen in Table 18. For 2003 the median value was 119, i.e. the median owner-occupier 
family had a debt (net liability), which amounted to 119% of their income in 2003. More than a fifth of 
the owners had positive savings (negative net liabilities in the table) besides their housing wealth. The 
rs demands close attention. Not much has changed for the 20% with 
rd
 – the value of the ratios dropped remarkably from 1988 to 
hese drops continued at a lower rate until 1994. In subsequent years the net liability/income 
ere at a 
30% most indebted owner-occupiers had net liabilities of at least twice their annual income. Owner-
occupiers in the two highest deciles had a ratio at 224 or above. And for the most indebted 10% of their 
net liabilities were at least nearly three times as high than their income.  
The development through the yea
positive savings besides their housing wealth. For the 3  decile, the increasing ratio expresses that a 
still greater share of the owner-occupiers have debts. For the owner-occupiers with debt – especially 
those in the deciles with the highest ratios
1991, and t
ratios among the indebted owners increased much more than the incomes, and by 2003 they w
                                                 
13 In fact, t s the case. The housi g wealt come r pr ted in (Lunde, 200his i n h/in atios are esen 5). 
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much hig el  1987. The m  va e  5 m  2 e n lt 
ecreas om 19  the  in 19 f 11% d an ase f 1994 03 o %. 
ermore, it has been convincingly argued th e ho  wea ncom ios h reac  
e-hig vel at  entr  to 2 (Lun 005) he s ty in net l ity/h  
h ratio und in is pap s co ed, t t liab /inco
t the entrance to 2005, to
over, net lia ty/income ratio varies w wne . Ag the ratios for owners b  
 years ge ar own i ble 1
 19. 
r-occ rs di  into iles b e of iabil as a ent o ss in e. 
r-occ rs (e ing elf-e yed) een 9 yea f age 7-20
1st
de
2n
de
3rd
de
4th
de
5th
de
6th
de
7th
de
8th
de
9th
de
1
d
her lev than in edian lue incr ased by 1% fro 1987 to 003, th et resu
of a d e fr 87 to  low 94 o  an incre rom  to 20 f 70
Furth at th using lth/i e rat ave hed an
all-tim h le  the a enc 005 de, 2 . If t tabili  the iabil ousing
wealt s fo  th er ha ntinu he ne ility me ratios must rely on an all-time-
high a o. 
More the bili ith o r age ain, etween
30-39  of a e sh n Ta 9. 
Table
Owne upie vided  dec y siz net l ities per c f gro com
Owne upie xclud the s mplo betw 30-3 rs o . 198 03.  
Year  
cile 
d 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
 
cile 
0th 
ecile 
1987 41 79 104 124 143 162 183 210 255 > 255 
1988 43 84 110 130 150 169 191 219 267 > 267 
1989 41 80 105 126 145 163 184 211 257 > 257 
1990 39 80 102 120 136 153 172 197 244 > 244 
1991 39 76 98 117 133 150 170 194 237 > 237 
1992 49 82 103 119 135 151 168 191 226 > 226 
1993 49 83 107 124 140 157 175 199 242 > 242 
1994 42 78 96 112 126 141 157 176 211 > 211 
1995 48 83 104 122 139 155 173 196 232 > 232 
1996 45 87 111 130 148 166 186 208 245 > 245 
1997 65 101 126 147 165 185 206 231 273 > 273 
1998 65 107 131 152 172 192 213 240 286 > 286 
1999 69 107 133 155 174 193 216 241 286 > 286 
2000 69 110 138 159 179 199 219 247 293 > 293 
2001 66 110 137 158 179 198 219 248 291 > 291 
2002 74 117 145 167 188 209 232 259 312 > 312 
2003 72 121 149 170 190 211 234 267 319 > 319 
 
In general 30-39 year-old owner-occupiers have somehow higher net liability/income ratios than all 
e 
 
ore than 80% of the owner-occupiers in the age group had a net liability/income below the median 
r 
 
                                                
owner-occupiers and few are without debt. In this age group too, the net liability/income ratio was 
lowered in nearly all of the years from 1988 to 1994. After 1994, the net liabilities increased mor
than the 30-39 years old owner-occupiers’ incomes. The ratios have thereby grown to a markedly
higher level in all deciles. In 2003 half of the 30-39 year-old owner-occupiers had a debt of nearly 
twice their family income. More than 10% had a debt of at least at three times the income. In 1994 
m
ratio for 2003. Mortgages form the largest part of the owner-occupiers’ gross and net liabilities. Fo
half of the 30-39 year-old owner-occupiers in 2003 the mortgage debt was above 163% of their 
income and 20% had a ratio of 227% or above.14
 
For the median owner-occupier between 30-39 years of age, the net liability/income ratio increased
by 33%, of which the net result of the decrease from 1987 to 1994 was at 12% and the following 
increase from 1994 to 2003 at 51%. 
 
 
14 The mortgage debt/income ratios are not presented in this paper. 
 32
For owner-occupiers in the other age groups the development in the net liability/income ratios
shared similar features over the years. The net liability
 have 
/income level is somehow higher in 2003 
an in 1987 for all groups. Of course, the levels of the ratios fall with age. For owner-occupiers 
etween 50-59 and 60-69 years of age, the fall in the net liability/income ratios was less pronounced 
n stronger than for other age groups. 
le 
. 
his can be interpreted as showing that the owner-occupation sector – an important part of the 
atios 
nuous 
elief that interest rates should matter “because they influence home ownership affordability and 
1 to 
 and 
 
 as 
re 
 and the Danish interest expenditures are presented before tax. 
the 
ate 
l” increasing yield curve 
roughout nearly the whole period since 1996. At the end of March 2005 the adjustable-rate 
, 
e 
th
b
up to 1994, and after this year the increase in the ratios has bee
 
In general it can be concluded that the owner-occupiers have become more indebted in relation to 
their incomes since the middle of the 1980s and of course, especially since the housing market cyc
turned in 1993-1994. Presumably, the owner-occupiers are more indebted now than ever before
T
Danish economy – has been influenced by a higher degree of financial fragility. However, income 
must be used to service the debt and even though the debt – shown in the net liability/income r
– has increased, the debt service burden has been lightened during the last 10 years’ conti
interest rate drops. The question to be answered below is whether the drop in the interest rates have 
been so strong and the interest payments have been reduced so sharply that the owner-occupiers’ 
debt services do not require a greater share of their incomes. In the next sections, the interest 
payments and the interest/income ratios are analysed. 
 
 
15. Owner-occupiers’ interest incomes and expenditures.  
The analysis of the owner-occupiers’ capital structure as well as other LTV measures above do not 
take interest rates into account. The standard argument is in accordance with McCarthy and Peach’s 
b
because they represent the yield on a competing asset in a household’s portfolio” (2004, p. 5). 
 
Statistics on the Danes’ debt services do not exist, but their interest incomes and expenditures are 
registered as a by-product of the taxation. Internationally, statistics on owner-occupiers’ debt 
services seem rare. However, the Federal Reserve Board publishes quarterly data for the 
households’ debt-service ratio, measured as the required payments on mortgage and consumer debt 
as a share of after-tax personal income. This ratio showed a weak drop from 12.13% in 1987Q
10.79% in 1993Q4. Subsequently, the ratio began a continuous increase to 13.37% in 2002Q4
stabilised at that level up to 2004Q3. Another and broader ratio for homeowners includes auto 
leases, insurance, and property taxes. This ratio has followed a similar development but with rather
weak changes, reached the period’s maximum at 16.23% in 2002Q4 and fell to 15.83% in 2004Q3. 
(Federal Reserve Board, 2004). These figures can only in their first version be compared with –
is done below – the Danish net interest/income ratios. The Danish data are based on incomes befo
tax and both the US debt service rates
 
Falling interest rates have reduced interest payments by themselves. At a given loan debt and term 
the owner-occupiers’ debt services are also reduced. Another result presented above was that 
shift in the debt structure against a slightly higher mortgage share after the financial deregulation 
represented a change to lower interest rates, which reduced the interest payments. Moreover, debt 
services were lowered by much longer terms on mortgages than on commercial bank loans. As a 
third factor, the move in the choice of mortgage type from fixed interest rate loans to adjustable-r
mortgages reduced interest payments further, because of the ”norma
th
mortgages’ market share was at 50% of the owner-occupiers’ mortgages (Danmarks Nationalbank
2005). As the interest-only mortgages were introduced in October 2003, they do not influence th
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data in the paper and moreover as only interest payments and not debt services are shown, interes
only loans cannot have influenced the results. However, in a wider financial security context it 
seems of relevance that interest-only mortgages cover 23% of the owner-oc
t-
cupiers’ outstanding 
ortgages at the end of March 2005. 
the 
ps on property value and debt size must be recognised, too. The 
ring of in s p n  and o  on
in real house and flat prices that has been ob ce 1  Pe 4; M
and Peach, 2004). At the same time the inte rops d the market values of the 
on fixed i st mortga lready therefore, it cannot be taken for granted that interest 
ents have dropped even though the int ate has d d. 
wner-occ s’ interes mes and expenditures are included in the study, based on data 
 statistics, as inte comes and expenditure cluded in the personal l 
es. The aggregate interest incomes an nditures e years 1 003 are s in 
 20.15 Th tatistic o erest inco s not be uenced b  change i ealth 
ition from  on, bec the assets ed do no  interes
 20. 
egate inte come an enditures. ner-occu excludin  self-empl
 – 2003. M  DKK. 
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The mentioned factors work against lower interest payments at a loan of given size. However, 
influence of interest rate dro
lowe terest rates i art of the “fu damentals”
served sin
rest rate d
 has had a str
993 (Haller
have increase
ng influence
dersen, 200
 the growth 
cCarthy 
debt ntere ges. A
paym erest r roppe
 
The o upier t inco
from the tax rest in s are in  capita
incom d expe  for th 987-2 hown 
Table e tax 
7
s n int mes ha en infl y the n the w
defin  199 ause  remov t carry t.  
 
Table
Aggr rest in d exp  All ow piers ( g the oyed). 
1987 illion
Year Interes
me,  co
cial ba
Other in
income 
Interest
penditu
mortgag
Interest
ditures,
mercial
Other in
expen
Net 
expendi
1987 4225 1980 31462 10069 6869 42196 
1988 4455 1871 32935 10437 6844 43890 
1989 4635 1572 33763 10828 6512 44896 
1990 5554 1629 33423 11913 6378 44530 
1991 5406 1535 33867 11993 5843 44762 
1992 12470* 751 33748 13351 5222 39101 
1993 11863 535 35223 11940 3997 38762 
1994 9.689 663 32.755 11860 991 35254 
1995 9921 581 35564 11999 995 35056 
1996 9173 0 1) 34899 11163 765 37654 
1997 8167 524 36648 11236 731 39924 
1998 8057 412 37516 11753 676 41475 
1999 6780 410 36708 11389 670 41577 
2000 8865 375 38005 13463 681 42910 
2001 9704 387 40263 13688 820 44680 
2002 9367 355 40709 12612 704 44304 
2003 8208 312 40039 11484 607 43610 
* The owner-occupiers’ interest income of deposits etc. in commercial banks increases too much in 1992. It must be supposed the figures for th
before are too low.
e years 
                                                
1) In 1996 ”other interest incomes” are included in ”interest income in commercial banks.  
 
 
15 The interest incomes in Table 20 and the following tables do not include the imputed rent of the owner-occupier’s 
dwelling, even though this income was regarded as a capital income until the removal of the imputed rent tax in 2000. 
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Table 20 contains aggregate numbers. The net interest expenditures dropped from 1991 to 1995. 
Unfortunately part of the drop could possibly be explained by an incredibly high increase in the interest 
incomes from 1991 to 1992 of 7 bn. DKK. In contrast, from 1995 to 2003 net interest expenditures rose 
gain by 24%, while the increase in the consumer price index through the period only was 19%, i.e. 
esides the interest rate drops, since 1992 the owner-occupiers’ interest expenditures have been 
 by the change from commercial bank loans to mortgages. The deregulation and the strong 
rchase-
nd for the non-bank consumer credit. Therefore, the owner-occupiers no longer have 
ignif ice othe rtga k  est 
expenditu  hav sed slo ith v d. s n 
general and the change from commercial ban  mo  been more than offset by the 
g of larger loans. Surprisin he owner est expen s on ord bank loa not 
unless slig fter 2001.  
lations of aggregates at the o level of t income penditur ht be cri  for 
g an unsa e. an obvio rection is lculate t rest inc nd 
ditures for the “average” owner-occupier wn in T . Of co his chan tly 
es the ne further dec ons. A h it coul oted that wner-oc
 on averag  higher nom  interests on mortgages as s on com ial bank an 
87, the av  interest e ure had dropped slightl
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Othe rest 
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Net
exp   
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even with the reduced interest rates the owners’ aggregate real net interest expenditures have shown an 
increase through most of the period of strong house price increases. All interest figures in Table 20, as 
in the tables below, are before tax. However, an obvious change is to include taxation when considering 
Table 20. In this case the net interest expenditures after tax have increased, as debtors could deduct 
interest expenditures at a tax rate of 50% in 1987 compared with 33% in 2003. 
 
B
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money mortgages a
any s icant debt serv
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s on loans 
e increa
r than mo
wly and w
k loans to
ges and ban
ariable spee
rtgages have
loans. Since
So the intere
1993 inter
t rate drops i
raisin gly, t s’ inter diture inary ns did 
drop htly a
 
Calcu macr  interes  and ex es mig ticised
givin tisfying pictur First, us cor  to ca he inte omes a
expen  as sho able 21 urse, t ge mos
expos ed of ompositi lthoug d be n  othe cupiers in 
2003 e paid inal  well a merc loans th
in 19 erage net xpendit y. 
 
Table
Average i st inco endi owner-  (excl self-e ). 
1987 K. 
Year 
ercial b
r inte
come nditures
ortgagem  mer i
rest exp
u m-res, co
c al ban
r inte
enditu
 interest 
enditures
1987 3698 1733 27535 8812 6012 36929 
1988 3835 1611 28349 8984 5891 37778 
1989 4001 1357 29145 9347 5621 38755 
1990 4817 1413 28991 10333 5532 38626 
1991 4880 1385 30569 10825 5274 40403 
1992 11011 663 29801 11790 4611 34527 
1993 10398 469 30873 10466 3503 33975 
1994 8391 574 28369 10272 858 30534 
1995 8568 501 28124 10363 860 30277 
1996 7702 01) 29300 9372 642 31613 
1997 6806 437 30543 9364 609 33273 
1998 6631 339 30877 9673 556 34136 
1999 5536 335 29974 9300 547 33950 
2000 7215 305 30933 10958 554 34925 
2001 7905 315 32798 11150 668 36396 
2002 7519 285 32680 10125 565 35565 
2003 6601 251 32202 9236 488 35074 
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1) In 1996 “other interest income” is included in “interest income in commercial banks”. 
 
 
16 The variation in owner-occupiers’ interest income and expenditures, by income.  
xt 
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Only the net interest expenditures in the owner-occupier families are analysed in this and in the ne
section. Primarily the economic and financial stability co
the gros
incomes. Analogically, the net and not the 
 
interes xpendit es, as o course 
gross liabilities were analysed above. 
me inte e res ca a
The o r-occu rs have een dis buted i eciles cording o the si ross in e for 
each  in Tab 22. For each single decile the aver  net in est exp diture s been 
calcu  and is own. N t surpri gly, th omina verage t inter ure inc es 
with ncome en thro h the 1 years, t  media alue fo the ann net 
intere pendit es have een rat  simila Some d tributio l chan  are fo d as th minal 
net in t expe itures h e been ightly r uced in e high come d iles bu lightly
incre st 7 inc e deci . A par l expla tion se s to be at own s with er 
incom nto a h er deg  raise justable ate mo ages w  low in rest payments at  
incre  yield rve. 
 
Table
Avera et inte t expen tures f all own -occup rs (exc ing the lf-emp yed), d ed 
into d s by si  of thei ncome. 87-20 . DKK.
Incom
decile
ear 
st decile nd decile rd decile th decile th decile th decile th decile th decile th  decile th  decile 
Y
1987 18682 23782 26533 29473 34391 36960 39949 45385 50849 63313 
1988 20186 25033 27926 30767 34895 37934 40280 45200 52260 63322 
1989 19883 24808 30056 31397 35864 38681 41899 46729 52821 65441 
1990 21935 24658 28607 31520 36231 37924 41509 47618 51548 64747 
1991 21887 27091 30602 33815 37866 40073 44037 47560 52012 69114 
1992 19156 23350 27356 29302 35049 37564 38453 41474 44929 48658 
1993 18755 23375 26913 29289 34713 36263 39336 41597 44129 45398 
1994 16990 21825 24973 28150 30817 33261 34788 36713 40575 37259 
1995 16181 21860 25050 28087 31596 33202 35284 37758 41125 32633 
1996 16886 22200 24346 29149 32184 34367 36096 38705 41455 40758 
1997 17515 22716 26259 30432 34231 35684 38679 41236 44773 41222 
1998 17781 22218 27547 31361 34439 36565 39168 41761 46214 44316 
1999 18455 23225 27653 31350 34868 35857 38377 41148 44667 43913 
2000 19284 23644 28202 32618 35478 37319 39466 42360 45980 44917 
2001 19277 23606 29161 33975 36170 38339 42693 42796 47290 50667 
2002 19792 24605 28607 33187 366 8 40  4 4 9 4 65 84 37 90 593 3430 491 59
2003 19099 10 27980 3189 5 2 40 4 4240 2 35 81 37 54 287 1832 6124 46692 
 
A rather m inte ng s ure und n th  inte com d w
wner oss mes in net in t ex itur om os. he e 
es ar wn ble Two eral res be r ked st, th erag t in  
nditu com ios  som at w ncre g in  in each year. Secon  av e 
 for a ner  bee arly ed f  1987 to 2003. The degree of reduction is increasing 
 the d  nu . Th the ge r  dec ed m thro the “ sing rket 
re” y in a iles ce 1 the ter pen re/in e ra have pped
ore resti truct is fo  whe e net rest expenditures are pare ith 
the o s’ gr inco teres pend e/inc e rati The average ratios in t singl
decil e sho  in Ta  23.  gen  featu  can emar . Fir e av e ne terest
expe re/in e rat drop ewh ith i asin come d, the erag
ratio ll ow s has n ne  halv rom
with ecile mber ird, avera atios reas ost ugh hou  ma
failu ears ll dec . Sin 993 net in est ex ditu com tios  dro  
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slightly in h de s a combine ult e falling inter  rates, steeply rising house and flat 
s, lar ebt ases  use djus -rate rtga   
e 23.
age n tere pen res a er c of gr incom or al ner- pier xclud  
elf-em yed) ided  dec  by s f the com 987- 3 
e 
s / 
ear 
1
decile 
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decile 
3rd
decile 
4th 
decile 
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decile 
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decile 
7th
cile 
8th
decile 
9th 
cile 
10
decile 
 eac cile a d res of th est
price ge d incre  and  of a table  mo ges.
 
Tabl  
Aver et in st ex ditu s a p ent oss e f l ow occu s (e ing
the s plo , div  into iles ize o ir in e. 1 200
Incom
decile
st      de-   de- th 
 
All 
Y
1987 21.1 17.4 15.8 14.9 15.2 14.8 14.5 14.6 14.1 12.6 14.7 
1988 21.6 17.6 16.1 14.9 14.7 14.5 13.9 13.8 13.8 11.9 14.3 
1989 20.1 16.7 16.4 14.4 14.5 14.1 13.8 13.7 13.3 11.8 14.0 
1990 22.1 16.2 15.2 14.0 14.2 13.5 13.3 13.5 12.6 11.2 13.5 
1991 19.9 15.8 14.2 13.5 13.4 12.9 12.9 12.5 11.9 11.4 13.0 
1992 17.4 13.5 12.6 11.5 12.2 11.9 11.1 10.7 10.1 7.8 10.9 
1993 16.8 13.3 12.2 11.3 11.9 11.3 11.1 10.5 9.7 7.1 10.5 
1994 13.4 11.6 10.7 10.3 10.2 10.0 9.5 9.0 8.6 5.6 9.1 
1995 12.6 11.3 10.4 10.0 10.1 9.7 9.3 9.0 8.5 4.8 8.7 
1996 12.8 11.4 10.0 10.2 10.1 9.8 9.3 8.9 8.3 5.8 8.9 
1997 13.2 11.3 10.4 10.3 10.3 9.8 9.6 9.2 8.6 5.6 9.0 
1998 12.9 10.7 10.5 10.2 10.0 9.7 9.4 9.0 8.6 5.8 8.9 
1999 13.2 10.9 10.2 9.8 9.8 9.1 8.9 8.5 8.0 5.5 8.6 
2000 13.6 10.7 10.1 9.9 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 7.9 5.3 8.4 
2001 12.7 10.2 9.9 9.9 9.4 9.0 9.1 8.2 7.8 5.7 8.4 
2002 12.9 10.4 9.5 9.4 9.3 8.6 8.4 8.0 7.2 5.1 8.0 
2003 12.5 9.9 9.0 8.8 8.8 8.3 8.1 7.6 7.2 5.0 7.7 
 
Even though the net interest expenditure/income ratios in Table 23 have been stabilised to a h
egree after 1993, the use of average figures fo
igh 
r all owner-occupiers can hide a lot of differences, for 
ch 
os 
 
 age.  
rather important determinant of the owner-occupiers’ capital structure and interest 
defined as the age of the oldest member, might be seen 
 7 above it was shown that the 
 in all deciles. This may make 
pt e c ion th  exp o d  t
occupier  based on the s s bee t th
wealth/income ratios do no o an tial d en the age groups of owner-
o ers below 50 years of age nde, 2005
 
The fact is that owner-occupier w 30 ye ss g  and net i  
expenditures an mes than in the next ag p. The ow ccupiers bet n 30-39 y  
age have on average the largest s and ne est expend s, as shown able 24. Above 
th ge intere omes incre and the st expend decrease increasin  
d
example between the age groups and between regions. Moreover, it must be emphasised that ea
number in the single deciles in Table 23 has been found as an average that covers a distribution of rati
in each decile. With the exception of the age variable, these distributional factors are not further
analysed in this paper. 
 
 
17. The variation in owner-occupiers’ interest income and expenditures, by age – and for 
wner-occupiers between 30-39 years ofo
Age is a 
payments. In reality, the age of the family, 
as a proxy for the family’s actual placement in the life cycle. In Table
-occupiers’ net liability/housing wealth ratios decrease with ageowner
it tem ing to draw th
’s age. However
onclus
t vary t
at interest
ame statistical source it ha
y substan
enditures als
egree betwe
ecrease with
n found tha
he owner-
e housing 
ccupi (Lu ). 
s belo ars of age on average have le ross nterest
d inco e grou ner-o wee ears of
 gros t inter iture  in T
is a st inc ase  intere itures with g age.
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However, if the variation in the net interest expenditure/income ratios were compared, the ratios 
were decreasing with age and therefore highest for owner-occupiers below 30 years of age but only 
slightly higher than for the next age group. 
 
Table 24. 
Average interest income and expenditures. 
Owner-occupiers (excluding the self-employed), by age. 2003. DKK. 
ge – t Ayears Interest income,  commercial banks 
Other 
interest 
incomes 
Interest ex-
penditures, 
mortgage 
Interest expen-
ditures, com-
mercial banks 
Other interest 
expenditures 
Net interes
expenditures  
< 30 1511 20 32349 12938 530 44286 
30-39 2904  63 45843 14242 1032 58149 
40-49 2964 200 44120 12387 556 53899 
50-59 5421 303 34906 10104 420 39705 
60-69  8869 354 22421 5252 153 18602 
> 70 15676 402 9691 1956 260 -4171 
All 6601 251 32202  9236 488 35074 
 
Owner-occupiers between 30-39 years of age have been in focus in this paper because they 
sent m ke hol r-oc au  t
in this ag rs (c mil  y  a
these two youngest age groups have the highe bilit alth ratios. As the fact that 
ge group moreover has the est net in xpenditu one mor ortant re  
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ntioned t e average in  (before t a person years old in Denmark i  
61,400 D nd the average family inc r a coup h children was 556,600 DKK 
stic Denm 004). 
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First, nal av st in  expen or own iers b
years gain f 198 e prese able 2 ustrate gnitude
of the ccupie inter s and res in Tabl 1 and  it can
be me hat th come ax) for  30-34 n 2002
was 2 KK a ome fo le wit
(Stati ark, 2
 
Table
Avera ndi ner-oc exclud elf-em etween
30-39  age. 1 KK.
Year 
commercial banks income penditures, diture
r inte rest exp er inter  interest 
1987 1846 807 42181 12540 9025 61094 
1988 1726 714 43243 12901 9317 63021 
1989 1834 498 44090 12815 8486 63059 
1990 1980 405 43731 14229 7634 63209 
1991 2158 592 45918 14534 8642 66343 
1992 3675 225 45252 15460 6988 63800 
1993 3514 115 46304 15531 5725 63931 
1994 2180 131 41353 14687 1652 55381 
1995 1844 133 40941 15038 1710 55712 
1996 2034 01)  42710 14112 1139 55927 
1997 1531 128 44850 14321 1094 58605 
 38
1998 2027 100 45504 14887 1023 59287 
1999 1796 89 44265 14934 980 58294 
2000 1899 88 45598 16905 988 61504 
2001 2759 72 49036 17372 1251 64830 
2002 2277 159 47835 15955 1019 62372 
2003 2904 63 45843 12242 1032 58149 
1) In 1996 “oth
 
er interest income” is included in “interest income in commercial banks” 
nts on mortgage and bank 
v se , e  p  a y g
ve been reduced by close to a tenth. The average net interest expenditures in 2001-2002 were 
sligh er  20 er  19 8 ow cu etw -39
e. Ho , a tri su ese rs reb irs uy s th
net in exp res at le 98 93 en us sul
rong t r  in 1994 – their ere nd dro  1994, while
 to 20 ir n res di creased again. Their n res di d 
ed s rtl on na ith tab  m es.
ver, 25 op  av con , a dis n t w
e gr hu h , m ri l a s m pe d. In
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ecile rdi e s the me
 26 
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 of a ide de y s nco 87 DK
e 
eciles / 1  decile 2  decile 3  decile 4 decile 5  decile 6  decile 7  decile 8  decile 9  decile 10
th  decile 
The owner-occupiers between 30-39 years of age have on average had rather low and unchanged 
nominal interest incomes in the period. The average nominal interest payme
loans ha
loans ha
e increa d a little  while th  interest ayments on purch se-mone  mortga es and non-bank 
only tly high  and in 03 low than in 87-198 for the ner-oc piers b een 30  years 
of ag wever rather s king re lt for th  owne and the y for f t time b ers, wa at 
their terest enditu  were r her stab from 1 7 to 19  and th – obvio ly as re t of 
the st  interes ate drop  1993-  net int st expe itures pped in  from 
1995 01 the et inte t expen tures in et inte t expen tures ha
dropp ince, pa y as a c sequence of refi ncing w  adjus le-rate ortgag  
 
Howe  Table  shows the devel ment in erage ditions nd the tributio al aspec ithin 
the ag oup is t s lost. T erefore ore profound dist butiona nalyse ust be rforme  
Table 26 the net i erest expenditure occupi  in the me age oup as a ove are ided 
into d s acco ng to th ize of ir inco s.  
 
Table
Avera et inte t expen tures f owner- cupier excludi  the se employ ) betwe 30-39 
years ge, div d into ciles b ize of i me 19 -2003 K   
Incom st nd rd th th th th th th 
d
Year 
1987 31661 38463 44688 52554 57428 63391 68026 73571 80621 100542 
1988 33321 43579 47112 52986 59365 64183 68174 75190 84827 101515 
1989 32135 39504 48152 54953 60416 63802 70606 74698 85035 10 21 88 
1990 33302 39383 47694 55811 58641 64054 69543 75019 83910 104782 
1991 35401 45164 51993 60331 61834 66553 71131 75028 82976 113073 
1992 34590 43495 50142 56748 61972 65471 70072 73194 80921 101430 
1993 32237 43166 50221 56704 61470 63724 70677 72676 80726 107751 
1994 27216 37765 45411 51221 53872 58217 61513 62924 70659 85051 
1995 29233 37171 44655 50697 55922 58150 61031 65517 70782 83999 
1996 27977 38601 46120 50698 54887 59191 62546 64191 72370 82723 
1997 29769 37505 46901 53591 58050 61492 64781 68723 75832 89442 
1998 28489 37486 48515 55327 58962 63530 66573 68897 76040 89070 
1999 30835 39045 48414 53476 58997 61720 65051 68019 73845 83572 
2000 30746 39768 49711 55595 61868 66287 67698 73652 80123 89628 
2001 31192 40382 51652 59519 62498 68078 74554 75622 85405 99396 
2002 33363 41843 50944 58639 62536 64977 68334 72176 77964 92984 
2003 31495 38171 48371 54220 59913 62838 66300 71075 72923 76188 
 
Clearly the net interest expenditures increase with the income through the deciles. While the 
average net interest expenditures for all owner-occupiers between 30-39 years of age reached a 
minimum in 1994, in a couple of deciles the minimum value was reached in 1995, and in the 10th 
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Tabl
Aver et in st ex ditur n per t of s inc e for er-o piers cludi the 
self-e yed) ween -39 y s of a  divided into deciles by size of income 1987-2003.  
Incom
decile
Year 
st 
ecile 
nd 
ecile 
rd 
ecile 
h 
ecile 
h 
ecile 
th 
ecile 
th de-
ile 
h 
ecile 
h  de-
ile 
th 
ecile 
 
All 
1987 24.9 21.9 21.0 20.4 19.8 20.2 20.2 20.2 19.9 19.2 20.3 
1988 25.8 23.9 21.7 19.9 19.6 19.5 19.2 19.6 20.0 18.5 20.1 
1989 24.8 21.2 21.1 19.8 19.4 18.8 19.3 18.8 19.2 17.6 19.4 
1990 25.2 20.5 20.5 19.7 18.3 18.5 18.7 18.6 18.6 17.8 19.0 
1991 23.7 20.0 18.0 18.5 17.5 17.7 17.8 17.4 17.2 18.1 18.1 
1992 22.6 18.9 17.0 17.0 17.1 16.9 16.9 16.4 16.4 16.0 17.0 
1993 21.0 18.8 17.1 17.0 17.0 16.4 17.1 16.3 16.3 16.9 17.0 
1994 16.7 15.7 14.9 14.8 14.5 14.6 14.5 13.7 13.9 12.7 14.3 
1995 17.7 15.0 14.3 14.4 14.7 14.3 14.0 14.0 13.6 12.5 14.1 
1996 16.6 15.4 14.6 14.1 14.1 14.2 14.0 13.3 13.5 11.7 13.7 
1997 17.1 14.6 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.3 14.0 13.8 13.6 12.2 13.9 
1998 16.0 14.0 14.3 14.3 14.1 14.2 13.9 13.3 13.2 11.4 13.5 
1999 17.3 14.2 13.7 13.3 13.6 13.3 13.0 12.5 12.1 9.9 12.7 
2000 16.4 14.0 13.6 13.3 13.7 13.6 13.0 12.9 12.4 10.1 12.8 
2001 16.2 13.7 13.8 13.9 13.3 13.5 13.6 12.7 12.6 10.4 12.9 
2002 17.4 13.9 13.4 13.4 13.1 12.6 12.3 11.9 11.3 9.9 12.3 
2003 16.8 12.6 12.4 12.0 12.2 11.9 11.6 11.4 10.4 7.9 11.1 
 
 
As seen in Table 27, the average net interest expenditure/income ratio in the deciles decreases with 
increasing income for all the years. This relation indicates that housing consumption as a part of the 
owner families’ consumption decreases with increasing incomes. 
 
Second, an important factor in the owner-occupiers’ risk exposure and in a financial stability 
context is the fact that the owners between 30-39 years of age had a net interest expenditure/inco
ratio of 20% (median value) in 1987, i.e. interest payments took up a relatively large share of the 
families’ incomes before tax. As the interest could be deducted at a 50% tax rate from 1987 on, the 
median ratio for the net interest expenditures after t
me 
ax would have been about 10% of the gross 
come. However, as the average income tax rate could easily have been 50%, the level for the net in
interest expenditure/income ratio after tax would still be around 20%. Moreover, the owner-
                                                 
16 Another additional financial explanation could be that as the loan size increases with income, the prepayment of fixed 
interest rate mortgages become more profitable as the income increases. 
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occupiers had to include imputed rent tax, land tax, expenditures for maintenance etc. in their 
housing expenditures.  
 
These ratios dropped through the years 1987-1993 to a level of 14% in 1994 and had been reduced 
to 11% in average since. In the lowest income decile, the ratio has been stable since 1994, while the 
tios have dropped – 2-3 percentage points – in the following seven deciles and with even more in 
e two highest income deciles. Seen from an after-tax perspective the drop in the net interest 
 expenditures has 
 after 
been 
 positive observation of the examination of the owner-occupiers’ risk exposure and of the 
 
duced than the ratios before tax. Moreover, the 
ow
stro justable-rate 
mo  this part 
f the owner-occupiers’ net interest expenditure/income ratios after tax back to the 1987 level. 
ed 
e 
nd 
 general and especially during a period of steep rising house and flat prices like the present one, 
ine the risk of financial stress among the Danish 
wner-occupiers and the financial stability of the owner-occupied household sector. This theme for 
 the owners’ ability to repay the debt, and 
c. net interest expenditure/income ratios to express their actual debt service burden. 
cs at household level. For this analysis of the financial stability among 
anish owner-occupiers from 1987 to 2003, a representative sample at around 40,000 owner-
than can be found for any other country. 
ra
th
expenditure/income ratios are less convincing as the tax rate for deducting interest
been reduced to 33%. Therefore the after-tax ratio for the median owner-occupier in 2003 must 
have been around 8.2% and thus somehow less below the net interest expenditure/income ratio
tax in 1987. Also the reduction in the net interest expenditure/income ratio after tax must have 
strongest in the two deciles with highest incomes. 
 
A
financial stability in the owner-occupation sector is that the net interest expenditure/income ratios 
are nearly halved and therefore at a somehow lower level than in 1987 at the start of the “housing
market failure”. However, the change is less convincing in an after-tax comparison, as the net 
interest expenditure/income ratios after tax are less re
ner-occupiers are obviously on average in a position of higher risk than in 1987 if there are 
ng interest increases, because 50% of the owner-occupiers’ mortgage debt carry ad
rtgages (March 2005). An interest rate increase of a few percentage points would bring
o
 
 
18 Conclusions and consequences: Possible reactions to an interest increase  
Denmark has a specialised, efficient and secure mortgage system, which allows owner-occupi
properties to be financed with mortgages of up to 80% of the market value. Above this LTV, 
commercial banks yield secured bank loans. Moreover, Denmark has a leading position in th
international household debt race and has the highest mortgage debt per capita. Only Switzerla
and the Netherlands have higher residential mortgage debt to GDP ratios. 
 
In
an important economic policy object is to exam
o
the paper has primarily been pursued by estimating  
a. net liability/housing wealth ratios to express the security behind the owner-occupiers’ debt, 
b. net liability/income ratios to express
 
The tax statistics contain information about the owner-occupied dwellings’ publicly assessed 
property values, financial assets and liabilities, interest incomes and expenditures, incomes and 
household characteristi
D
occupier families (excluding the self-employed) has been drawn for each year. The financial 
institutions and tax authorities have reported these data to the register, thereby ensuring the 
precision of the data. The large representative samples of individual households have made it 
possible to make a more detailed analysis of the financial stability in the owner-occupation sector 
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And now to the results of the study. 
 
The debt (net liabilities) has been rising in general for owner-occupiers in all age groups. The 
growth in net liabilities took off in 1994, and the debt of young owner-occupiers more than doubled
obviously representing a rise in real terms. 
 
The owner-occupier’s net liabilities have been compared with the value of their owner-occupied 
properties, i.e. t
, 
heir housing wealth in ratios. In general the distribution of the owner-occupiers 
ccording to the size of their net liability/housing wealth ratios has been nearly the same through all 
 the 
own 
ee of uniformity among the owner-occupiers’ 
apital structure is seen at the single income levels. This result indicates that buyers of houses and 
ption 
or 
nother remarkable result is that within the age groups the owner-occupiers’ net liability/housing 
ublicly assessed property values for the owner-occupied 
roperties have been used instead of “true” market values. Of course, no one knows what the “true” 
n 
ith 
his 
t 
imilar methodological reservations do not exist in relation to the owner-occupiers’ net liabilities, 
a
the years of the study. 
 
The net liability/housing wealth ratios strongly decrease with increasing age. However, within
younger age groups the capital structure has neither been improved in the direction of a better 
equity ratio nor worsened through the 16 years after 1987 in the study. Through 1988-2003 between 
40 and 50% of the owner-occupiers between 30-39 years of age were technically insolvent, i.e. they 
had negative equity as their net liabilities were larger than their housing wealth. Also, it is sh
that the older owner-occupiers experienced a slight debt rise.  
 
Somewhat surprising is the fact that a high degr
c
flats more or less can present the same percentage down payment when purchasing, as the net 
liability/housing wealth ratio does not increase with income, which could stimulate the assum
that in general buyers accept to buy as expensive a house or flat as they can obtain financing f
through loans. 
 
A
wealth ratios decreases with increasing property value. This strong dependency is not trustworthy 
and draws attention to the fact that p
p
market values are as the vast majority of houses and flats have not been on the market for years. O
average the assessed property values underestimate the prices for sold houses by one tenth but w
some variance in the single sale observations. This methodological problem means that the 
estimated net liability/housing wealth ratios can only be seen as indicators of the true ratios. As t
problem has been the same throughout the years of the study, the conclusions presented on the ne
liability/housing wealth ratios are not affected. 
 
A minor methodological problem is that the housing wealth (publicly assessed property value) has 
been estimated at the start of the year and the net liabilities at the end. A correction using the 
changes in a general house price indices gives slightly better results as the capital structure is 
improved slightly against higher equity in the years with steeply rising house prices and worsened 
in the “housing market failure” years. 
 
S
interest incomes and expenditures.  
 
As the family’s income forms the basis for paying debt services on the loans, the owner-occupier 
families’ net liability/income ratios have been analysed. In 2003 the median value for all owner-
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occupiers was 119, i.e. the median owner-occupier family had a net liability that amounted to 119
of their gross income in 2003. For the most indebted 10%, the net liability was at least 287% of 
their income. Half of the owners between 30-39 years of age had net liabilities of more 190% of 
their income and the most indebted 10% had a ratio above 319. 
 
Since 1994 the owner-occupiers’ net liabilities have increased much more than their in
% 
comes, as the 
edian value of the net liability /income ratio for all the owner-occupiers has increased by 70% and 
 an 
enditure/income ratio dropped during the “housing market 
ilure” from 1987 to 1993. Since 1994 the ratios have only been slightly reduced from 10.2% to 
 
s of 
uced 
 positive result of the examination of the financial stability in the owner-occupation sector is that 
ercentage points would bring this part of the owner-occupiers’ net interest expenditure/income 
as mass foreclosures. Possibly the most surprising 
spect in terms of the development of the owner-occupiers’ capital structure as shown above was 
e 
 feature of the Danish house market. Another conclusion must be that one or more 
trigger factors” must be active to release new crises in the market for owner-occupied houses and 
s 
 is an attempt to contribute to crisis prevention. 
. 
ite 
m
for owner-occupiers between 30-39 years of age, by 54%. Presumably the owner-occupiers are 
more indebted than ever before. This can be seen as evidence of the owner-occupation sector –
important part of the Danish economy – having been influenced by a high degree of financial 
fragility. 
 
Finally, the owner-occupiers’ interest incomes and expenditures have been analysed. The most 
striking result is that the net interest exp
fa
8.8% in 2003 as the median value for all owner-occupiers and from 14.5% to 12.2% for owner-
occupiers between 30-39 years of age. The net interest expenditure/income ratios are decreasing 
slightly with income in each individual years. However, it must be remembered that the ratios are 
estimated at before tax values. The relevant tax rate for deducting interest expenditures was reduced
to 50% in 1987 and further to 33% in 2001. For the median owner-occupier between 30-39 year
age in 1987 the net interest expenditure/income ratio at 20.2% before tax would have been red
to 10% after tax, while in 2003 the 12.2% before tax would have been 8.2% after tax. 
 
A
the net interest expenditure/income ratios are somewhat lower than in 1987 at the start of the 
“housing market failure”. However, owner-occupiers are obviously on average in a position of 
higher risk than in 1987 if there are strong interest increases as 50% of the owner-occupiers’ 
mortgage debt is adjustable-rate mortgages (March 2005). An interest rate increase of few 
p
after-tax ratios back to the 1987-level.  
 
During the “housing market failure” in 1987-1993, around 20-25% of the owner-occupiers were 
technically insolvent. One aspect of the failure w
a
that the frequency of technical insolvency was nearly as high in the years after 1993 as through th
”housing market failure”. A conclusion of the paper is therefore that negative equity exists as a 
permanent
”
flats. A widespread existence of technical insolvency cannot by itself be the cause of a new crisis.  
 
This analysis must not be seen as a forecast of the appearance of a new crisis in the Danish market
for owner-occupied houses and flats in the near future. However, since the paper does reveal that 
the Danish owner-occupation market is not strong enough to hinder a new crisis that could lead to 
mass foreclosures the analysis in the paper
 
The potential causes of a new ”housing market failure”  are rather difficult to describe beforehand
Ex post no difficulties exist in identifying the causes that released or contributed to the crisis. Qu
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similarly, the causes of financial crises and the theories about their appearance constitute a tangled 
web, (see e.g. Davis, 1995; Eichengreen, 2002). 
 
As mentioned in the introduction the fear of an interest increase lies behind the very widespread 
interest in the solidity at the owner-occupation markets and in their robustness in the face an interes
increase.  
t 
nd 
 expected to have less effect on the house prices if the increase is moderate and appears as 
art of a balanced and increased economic growth. The effect could be much stronger if the interest 
 the Danish housing market – as in other housing markets with easy access to raising mortgage 
ng 
, 
 to 
 the Danish market the effect on debtors of an interest rate rise will differ a lot depending on 
ble 
negative equity following 
n interest rate increase.  
 
 
st 
 is impossible to link the debt data in the tax statistics with the type 
f mortgage. However, nothing indicates that highly indebted young owner-occupiers and first time 
 
The influence ex ante on the house prices of an interest rate increase might in the short run depe
on the current economic ”fundamentals” and economic-political conditions. Rising interest rates 
may be
p
rate rise is sharp and appears as a reaction to a monetary policy collapse or as a form of protection 
against speculation in the exchange rates. 
 
In
and other loans – the liquidity, i.e. the debt services on the loans and other parts of the housi
expenditures, has great influence on house prices, because many buyers decide on how much of 
their income, they are willing and able to pay for housing. Increasing interest rates would raise the 
costs of debt service and will therefore tend to lower house prices. This effect is relatively strong
and general economic prosperity must be widespread, high and expected to be long lasting if the 
liquidity effect is to be pushed down. A doubling of the short interest rate, for example, from 3%
6%, means a 100% increase in the interest payments, while an addition to economic growth of 3% 
only increases production and incomes by 3%. 
 
In
whether the owner-occupiers’ loans carry fixed interest rates or variable interest rates (adjusta
rates). 
 
For owner-occupiers with long fixed interest rate loans, the value of the debt will drop considerably. 
These owner-occupiers are unlikely to have any significant problems with 
a
 
Even at ordinary interest rises owner-occupiers with adjustable interest rate mortgages will 
experience an increase in payments. For example, an increase in the loan’s interest rate from 3% to 
4% increases the interest payments by 33%, albeit with a smaller increase in debt service, and this
will put pressure on these debtors’ liquidity. Moreover, many owner-occupiers raise bank loans 
above the 80% mortgage when financing their purchase and such loans normally carry a variable
interest rate. In contrast, the debt on the adjustable-rate mortgage will hardly be affected by an 
interest increase. If the prices for houses and flats drop markedly, highly indebted owner-occupiers 
with adjustable-rate mortgages will quickly be faced with solvency problems following an intere
rate rise. 
 
At the end of March 2005 50% of the mortgage banks’ outstanding loans to owner-occupiers 
carried interest adjustment. No information exists about which owner-occupiers have raised 
adjustable-rate mortgages, and it
o
buyers have fewer adjustable-rate mortgages than other owner-occupiers. 
 
 44
The fact that adjustable-rate mortgages comprise a large part of owner-occupiers’ and other debtor 
groups’ mortgages implies a change in the kind of interest rate risk and liquidity risk owner-
occupiers may experience as well as an increase in interest sensitivity. The interest rate reductions 
in 2001, which were motivated in the interest of monetary policy, may have been a driving force 
behind house and flat price rises and seem to indicate that interest policy has a strong and per
increasing effect on society. Denmark has never experienced the opposite reactions coming into 
effect in the face of an interest rate increase, as 
haps 
adjustable-rate mortgages were introduced during 
ears with still falling interest rates, but international experiences exist: ”Thus, in countries where 
olds regard 
variable mortgage as effectively fixed over the interest rate cycle.” (Debelle, 2004, p 60). As late as 
March 2005, the Danish central bank has repeated that only considerations for the exchange rate 
determine the monetary policy. 
 
A closer analysis has shown that house prices in Denmark as in the U.S. and surely in many other 
countries can be explained by the changes in ”fundamentals”. In an analysis of Danish house prices, 
Haller Pedersen concludes: ”Notwithstanding the high level, the increase in real property prices is 
by and large attributable to the underlying pattern of the households' disposable incomes, interest 
rates, and supply factors” (Haller Pedersen, 2004). The conclusion for the U.S. situation is similar. 
But this also means that in the face of sharper increases in interest rates – after a quick monetary 
political liquidation of the low interest rate regime or after a real monetary policy collapse – 
changes in ”fundamentals” will result in a certain fall in the house prices. The interest rate is an 
important factor among these “fundamentals”. 
 
If a sharp interest rate rise results in a remarkable fall in property prices, this set off well-known 
self-perpetuating forces and result in a severe decline in property prices and many foreclosures once 
more. A new collapse in house prices and a new housing market failure could begin. 
y
mortgages are predominantly variable rate, the rise in household indebtedness is likely to have 
increased the potency of monetary policy. The effect may well be broadly symmetrical. However, 
the extent of the increase in potency will be diminished by the degree to which househ
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1. 
Owner-occupiers divided into deciles by size of net liabilities as a per cent of housing wealth. 
Owner-occupiers (excluding the self-employed) below 30 years of age. 1987-2003. 
Year 1st 
decile 
2nd 
decile 
3rd 
decile 
4th 
decile 
5th 
decile 
6th 
decile 
7th 
decile 
8th 
decile 
9th 
decile 
10th 
decile 
1987 43 69 81 90 98 106 115 128 149 >149 
1988 59 83 95 105 114 124 135 149 175 > 175 
1989 52 75 87 96 104 113 123 138 165 > 165 
1990 50 72 84 93 102 111 122 134 158 > 158 
1991 54 76 89 99 108 118 129 144 170 > 170 
1992 55 74 86 95 103 110 118 130 151 > 151 
1993 53 74 86 95 103 112 120 132 152 > 152 
1994 47 69 80 90 98 106 116 128 148 > 148 
1995 48 71 84 94 104 113 123 135 159 > 159 
1996 51 74 87 96 105 113 123 135 158 > 158 
1997 48 74 88 100 109 119 131 145 171 > 171 
1998 59 80 95 107 117 127 139 155 182 > 182 
1999 55 76 89 99 109 118 128 142 165 > 165 
2000 50 73 85 96 104 113 122 135 158 > 158 
2001 48 72 85 93 102 111 121 134 157 > 157 
2002 49 71 85 95 105 113 123 134 154 >  154 
2003 45 72 83 92 101 109 117 130 150 > 150 
 
 
Table A2. 
Owner-occupiers divided into deciles by size of net liabilities as a per cent of housing wealth. 
Owner-occupiers (excluding the self-employed) between 30-39 years of age. 1987-2003. 
Year 1st 
decile 
2nd 
decile 
3rd 
decile 
4th 
decile 
5th 
decile 
6th 
decile 
7th 
decile 
8th 
decile 
9th 
decile 
10th 
decile 
1987 25 46 60 71 81 91 101 115 138 > 138 
1988 30 56 73 85 96 107 119 134 160 > 160 
1989 29 53 69 81 91 100 112 125 148 > 148 
1990 29 57 72 84 94 105 116 131 154 > 154 
1991 34 63 79 91 102 113 126 141 166 > 166 
1992 39 65 79 90 99 108 118 129 150 > 150 
1993 40 67 82 92 102 111 121 134 157 > 157 
1994 37 64 77 86 95 104 114 126 147 > 147 
1995 38 67 81 92 101 111 121 135 160 > 160 
1996 36 63 76 87 96 105 116 129 153 > 153 
1997 44 68 82 93 102 113 124 138 163 > 163 
1998 44 68 82 92 102 112 124 138 163 > 163 
1999 42 63 76 87 96 106 116 130 153 > 153 
2000 41 61 73 84 93 102 113 126 147 > 147 
2001 37 59 72 82 92 101 110 123 145 > 145 
2002 40 62 74 85 94 103 114 127 148 > 148 
2003 37 59 73 84 93 103 113 127 149 > 149 
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Table A3. 
Owner-occupiers divided into deciles by size of net liabilities as a per cent of housing wealth. 
Owner-occupiers (excluding the self-employed) between 40-49 years of age. 1987-2003. 
Year 1st 
decile 
2nd 
decile 
3rd 
decile 
4th 
decile 
5th 
decile 
6th 
decile 
7th 
decile 
8th 
decile 
9th 
decile 
10th 
decile 
1987 -8 16 30 41 53 64 77 92 114 >114  
1988 -9 18 35 50 63 77 91 109 135 > 135  
1989 -7 18 34 48 60 73 87 104 129 > 129 
1990 -8 19 35 49 64 77 91 107 132 > 132 
1991 -10 21 41 58 73 87 102 119 148 > 148 
1992 -6 25 44 59 73 86 98 112 135 > 135 
1993 -6 26 46 61 75 87 100 116 141 > 141 
1994 -7 26 46 62 73 85 98 112 133 > 133 
1995 -10 25 48 64 78 90 102 118 142 > 142 
1996 -3 29 48 63 75 87 98 113 136 > 136 
1997 9 38 55 69 81 92 105 120 146 > 146 
1998 8 37 55 69 81 93 105 121 146 > 146 
1999 8 37 53 65 77 88 100 113 137 > 137 
2000 8 35 50 62 73 83 95 109 132 > 132 
2001 10 35 50 62 73 84 96 111 133 > 133 
2002 10 35 51 63 74 85 96 110 134 > 134 
2003 9 35 51 64 75 86 98 112 135 > 135 
 
 
 
Table A4. 
Owner-occupiers divided into deciles by size of net liabilities as a per cent of housing wealth. 
Owner-occupiers (excluding the self-employed) between 50-59 years of age. 1987-2002. 
Year 1st 
decile 
2nd 
decile 
3rd 
decile 
4th 
decile 
5th 
decile 
6th 
decile 
7th 
decile 
8th 
decile 
9th 
decile 
10th 
decile 
1987 -35 -8 4 14 25 36 50 66 91 > 91  
1988 -44 -9 6 19 31 44 61 80 108 > 108  
1989 -40 -8 7 19 31 44 59 77 105 > 105 
1990 -47 -11 6 20 33 47 62 81 107 > 107 
1991 -46 -9 9 22 36 51 71 92 119 > 119 
1992 -42 -7 12 27 41 56 72 90 112 > 112 
1993 -45 -9 10 26 42 58 75 93 119 > 119 
1994 -51 -10 10 27 42 58 74 91 114 > 114 
1995 -51 -9 11 30 45 61 77 95 119 > 119 
1996 -41 -6 13 30 45 60 75 91 115 > 115 
1997 -31 0 18 35 51 65 80 97 124 > 124 
1998 -28 0 20 34 49 64 78 96 122 > 122 
1999 -25 2 19 34 48 61 75 91 115 > 115 
2000 -25 1 19 33 46 58 72 88 112 > 112 
2001 -27 0 18 32 46 59 72 87 111 > 111 
2002 -25 2 19 33 47 60 74 89 112 > 112 
2003 -25 1 20 35 49 61 75 91 115 > 115 
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Table A5. 
Owner-occupiers divided into deciles by size of net liabilities as a per cent of housing wealth. 
Owner-occupiers (excluding the self-employed) between 60-69 years of age. 1987-2003. 
Year 1st 
decile 
2nd 
decile 
3rd 
decile 
4th 
decile 
5th 
decile 
6th 
decile 
7th 
decile 
8th 
decile 
9th 
decile 
10th 
decile 
1987 -96 -51 -28 -15 -5 2 11 24 48 > 48  
1988 -114 -57 -32 -16 -5 3 14 31 57 > 57  
1989 -103 -52 -29 -13 -4 5 16 33 59 > 59 
1990 -111 -60 -32 -16 -5 5 17 35 63 > 63 
1991 -121 -62 -34 -14 -3 8 21 41 71 > 71 
1992 -115 -56 -29 -13 -2 9 23 43 70 > 70 
1993 -117 -58 -29 -12 -1 11 27 49 79 > 79 
1994 -114 -53 -27 -11 0 12 27 46 72 > 72 
1995 -109 -53 -26 -9 2 15 33 54 81 > 81 
1996 -106 -48 -24 -9 3 17 34 52 77 > 77 
1997 -93 -43 -20 -6 6 20 38 58 82 > 82 
1998 -96 -44 -20 -6 7 23 39 58 85 > 85 
1999 -83 -39 -18 -4 7 22 38 54 79 > 79 
2000 -74 -36 -17 -4 8 22 37 54 75 > 75 
2001 -72 -33 -15 -3 9 23 37 52 74 > 74 
2002 -73 -33 -14 -2 10 25 40 56 78 > 78 
2003 -67 -31 -13 0 13 26 40 57 79 > 79 
 
 
Table A6. 
Owner-occupiers divided into deciles by size of net liabilities as a per cent of housing wealth. 
Owner-occupiers (excluding the self-employed) 70 years of age and above. 1987-2003. 
Year 1st 
decile 
2nd 
decile 
3rd 
decile 
4th 
decile 
5th 
decile 
6th 
decile 
7th 
decile 
8th 
decile 
9th 
decile 
10th 
decile 
1987 -116 -66 -42 -26 -15 -9 -3 2 14 > 14  
1988 -137 -73 -46 -28 -16 -8 -3 3 18 > 18  
1989 -134 -73 -44 -28 -15 -8 -3 3 16 > 16 
1990 -146 -82 -51 -33 -19 -10 -4 3 19 > 19 
1991 -166 -94 -59 -38 -22 -11 -4 3 21 > 21 
1992 -180 -97 -59 -38 -22 -10 -4 3 20 > 20 
1993 -173 -98 -60 -37 -22 -11 -3 4 23 > 23 
1994 -176 -96 -58 -37 -21 -11 -3 5 27 > 27 
1995 -180 -98 -61 -38 -21 -10 -3 6 30 > 30 
1996 -164 -91 -57 -34 -19 -9 -3 7 31 > 31 
1997 -158 -89 -55 -34 -19 -9 -2 10 36 > 36 
1998 -160 -85 -53 -33 -18 -8 -2 11 36 > 36 
1999 -141 -77 -49 -29 -17 -7 -1 13 36 > 36 
2000 -139 -77 -46 -28 -15 -6 0 14 36 > 36 
2001 -131 -72 -45 -28 -15 -7 0 15 35 > 35 
2002 -133 -72 -44 -26 -14 -5 2 17 39 > 39 
2003 -120 -68 -42 -25 -13 -5 4 19 41 > 41 
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Table A7. 
All owner-occupiers (excluding the self-employed) divided into deciles by size of net liabilities as a 
per cent of housing wealth. 1987-2003. 
Year 1st 
decile 
2nd 
decile 
3rd 
decile 
4th 
decile 
5th 
decile 
6th 
decile 
7th 
decile 
8th 
decile 
9th 
decile 
10th 
decile 
1987 -46 -12 3 21 41 59 78 95 118 > 118 
1988 -53 -14 3 24 48 71 91 111 137 > 137 
1989 -50 -12 4 24 46 67 85 104 128 > 128 
1990 -58 -15 3 24 47 68 86 105 130 > 130 
1991 -67 -19 1 23 48 72 91 112 140 > 140 
1992 -66 -18 1 25 49 71 89 106 128 > 128 
1993 -68 -18 2 26 52 73 91 109 132 > 132 
1994 -69 -20 0 24 49 69 86 103 125 > 125 
1995 -71 -19 2 27 53 74 91 109 133 > 133 
1996 -64 -17 3 28 51 70 87 104 128 > 128 
1997 -55 -13 8 34 56 75 92 111 137 > 137 
1998 -54 -13 9 34 56 75 93 112 139 > 139 
1999 -50 -11 9 33 53 70 87 105 129 > 129 
2000 -46 -10 10 32 51 68 84 101 124 > 124 
2001 -45 -11 9 30 49 66 82 99 123 > 123 
2002 -44 -9 11 33 51 68 84 101 125 > 125 
2003 -43 -9 11 32 51 68 84 101 125 > 125 
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